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Abstract. We present a security proof for establishing private entanglement by means of recurrence-type
entanglement distillation protocols over noisy quantum channels. We consider protocols where the local devices are
imperfect, and show that nonetheless a confidential quantum channel can be established, and used to e.g. perform
distributed quantum computation in a secure manner. While our results are not fully device independent (which we
argue to be unachievable in settings with quantum outputs), our proof holds for arbitrary channel noise and noisy
local operations, and even in the case where the eavesdropper learns the noise. Our approach relies on non-trivial
properties of distillation protocols which are used in conjunction with de-Finetti and post-selection-type techniques
to reduce a general quantum attack in a non-asymptotic scenario to an i.i.d. setting. As a side result, we also
provide entanglement distillation protocols for non-i.i.d. input states.
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1. Introduction
Entanglement is a key resource in quantum information processing. Entanglement can be used to teleport quantum
information [1], to implement remote quantum gates [2], or for distributed quantum computation [3]. It allows one
to perform tasks that are not possible by classical means, such as secret key expansion vital for secure classical
communication. The latter is achieved through the famous and extensively studied quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. In these works, security was proven in a variety of ever more general
scenarios, considering noisy channels, imperfect devices and device-independent (DI) settings, where even the
local quantum devices are untrusted [11, 12, 13].
In contrast, the perhaps equally important task of establishing private entanglement, and the closely related
problem of establishing secure quantum channels, has not been resolved in equal generality. The latter has,
historically, received significantly less attention [14], until the very recent increase of interest [15, 16, 17, 18] in
security under ideal settings. The task of establishing private entanglement has been considered in the context
of noisy channels and both perfect [19] operations, and operations with local depolarizing noise [20, 21]. In these
works, either initial states that are identical and independently distributed (i.i.d.), or asymptotic scenarios are
assumed.
Here, we present a comprehensive treatment for the security of distillation protocols. To make our results broadly
applicable, we generalize the security model (i.e. powers of the adversary) over standard settings for protocols
with quantum outputs. Furthermore, we remove the need for asymptotic, or i.i.d. assumptions, allow for more
general noise models, and formulate and prove security criteria which ensure composability – i.e. the security of
the protocols when they are used in arbitrary contexts, e.g. as sub-routines of larger protocols.
More specifically, we consider arbitrary attacks employed by an adversary (Eve, the distributer of noisy or corrupt
Bell-pairs) and assume noisy communication channels and noisy local operations – essentially arbitrary noise
describing imperfect single- and two-qubit gates. We also extend adversarial powers beyond standard: the noisy
apparatus may leak all the information about the noise processes which occurred in a run of the protocol to Eve.
Our scenario, by necessity, falls short from full DI, as security under such weakest assumptions is not attainable
for protocols with a quantum output – any device used in any protocol with which a client can interact classically,
perhaps to test its performance, but which eventually outputs a quantum system, can always deviate from honest
behavior when the final quantum output is eventually demanded (independent of how elaborate the testing may
have been). This raises the questions of how DI assumptions can be relaxed such that security becomes possible
also for quantum output protocols, or how standard security models can be further extended.
DI assumptions can be understood as an extreme noisy scenario, where Eve has absolute control over the noise
processes. Our model relaxes this: Eve’s control is not exact (deterministic), but rather probabilistic, however
still perfectly heralded – while Eve may fail in her interventions, she still learns the noise realized. In this sense,
generalizing the types of noise the protocol is provably secure under in our model, corresponds to scenarios which
are ever closer to DI. Naturally, other generalizations of DI settings which make sense for protocols with quantum
outputs may be possible ∗.
We proceed by first providing a security analysis for i.i.d. inputs, and then generalize to non-i.i.d. states. This
is done by employing de-Finetti and post-selection symmetrization-based techniques. However, since we are in-
terested in security in arbitrary contexts, we must go beyond standard scenarios considered in entanglement
distillation works [19, 20, 21] and explicitly consider the adversarial quantum systems (containing e.g. purifica-
tions of all quantum states) as well. Therefore the symmetrization-based techniques cannot be straightforwardly
applied, but need to be adapted. We present and discuss the required additional steps of preprocessing, and
provide entanglement distillation protocols that are not restricted to i.i.d. inputs, but are capable of dealing with
general inputs. The latter is related to recent results in [22, 23, 24].
2. Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 3 we introduce the basic concepts, specify the overall setting and define
the confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols. Next, we summarize our main contribution in Sec. 4. In
Sec. 5 we show confidentiality of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols by proving confidentiality for
i.i.d. inputs in Sec. 5.1 and we extend this results to arbitrary initial states in Sec. 5.2 and 5.3. Finally we prove
∗E.g., we assume very primitive, but trusted, quantum devices, such as a device which can either forward an input quantum
system, or measure it in one basis. Already such a simple device invalidates our no-go observation.
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confidentiality whenever the noise transcripts leak to Eve in Sec. 5.4. We summarize and discuss our results in
Sec. 6.
3. The model and security guarantees
Entanglement distillation is modelled by considering three players, Alice and Bob, who wish to generate a shared
Bell pair, and Eve, who provides the initial pairs. Thus, Eve is connected to Alice and to Bob via a (generally
noisy) quantum channel which may be completely under her control. Alice and Bob are connected by a classical
authenticated, but not confidential, channel. In entanglement distillation protocols Alice and Bob apply local, in
general noisy, quantum operations to their pairs. To model this noise, we extend the approach of [20], where a
noise register, referred to as the “lab demon” (L) register L is used to store classical information about the local
noise history, is appended to Alice and Bob’s pairs. In this work, the L register is a quantum register, attached
to Alice and Bob. We represent the noisy maps of the entanglement distillation process as unitaries acting on an
enlarged Hilbert space. L thereby coherently applies Pauli operators onto the registers of Alice and Bob. Due to
the symmetry of Bell states |B00〉 = 1/
√
2(|00〉 + |11〉), it suffices to consider the case when the noise is applied
on Alice’s register only. To model the setting where Eve acquires information about the noise transcript during
the execution of the protocol, we assume that L informs Eve which noise operator was applied at each step. The
setting is illustrated in Fig. 1. In the remainder of this paper we elaborate further on the full quantum treatment
of L and Eve in terms of purifications, going beyond the setting of [20].
Figure 1. Illustration of the overall setting: Eve provides the initial pairs to Alice and Bob, who run the
entanglement distillation protocol. The noisy apparatus may leak the specification of the realized noise map to
Eve after every step of the protocol.
The proposed overall protocol under i.i.d. assumption involves several steps. First, Eve distributes n pairs (the
initial states), to Alice and Bob who apply local “twirl” operations (random, correlated local operations). Next,
Alice and Bob sacrifice some m ≈ √n pairs to check whether the fidelity, given with F (ρ, σ) = tr
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2 for
density operators ρ and σ, of the pairs is sufficient for entanglement distillation, via local σx and σz measurements.
If the fidelity F relative to |B00〉 is insufficient, they abort. Otherwise they proceed with a recurrence-type
entanglement distillation to produce a high fidelity Bell-pair from the remaining initial states, which may also be
aborted. Finally, Alice and Bob output their final state. For i.i.d. inputs, the twirl ensures that local σz and
σx correlation measurements can be used to estimate the fidelity of individual pairs. This estimate is crucial for
ensuring entanglement distillation via recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols. Later, we will generalize
to non-i.i.d. settings by prepending the protocol with symmetrization (permuting of the pairs) and tracing-out
steps.
To formalize the security requirements, we define the ideal map Fα,l, mapping the initial states of Alice and Bob
to a single Bell-pair, where α (abstractly) characterizes the noise levels in the channels connecting Eve to Alice
and Bob, and also the noise of the local devices, and l indicates that the noise transcripts leak to Eve. The ideal
map can intuitively be thought of as a map which simulates a real protocol as follows. In the case of an abort, it
replaces the final state with a fixed state σ⊥ABE . In the non-aborting case, however, it replaces the actual output
with a special state σα,P,lABE , which corresponds to the output of a real protocol where the noise transcripts leak to
Eve, utilizing distillation protocol P, that was successfully run with asymptotically many high-fidelity i.i.d. initial
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pairs. This is the best the noisy entanglement distillation protocol P could ever do. As we show later, σα,P,lABE is
a well-defined state for the entanglement distillation protocols and noise parameters considered here. That is, it
depends on the local noise parameters only, and not the initial states. Formally, we have for a given real map
(that is, the map realized by the execution of a real protocol)
(Eα,l ⊗ idE) (|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE) = pρσABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|f + (1− pρ)σ⊥ABE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail|f (1)
a corresponding ideal map
(Fα,l ⊗ idE) (|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE) = pρσα,P,lABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|f + (1− pρ)σ⊥ABE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail|f (2)
where |ψ〉ABE is a purification of the initial n-partite ensemble ρ(n)AB provided by Eve, pρ is the success probability
depending on the initial state ρ
(n)
AB , and σ
⊥
ABE is a fixed state output if the protocol is aborted. Observe that the
corresponding success probabilities pρ, per definition, are identical for the real and ideal maps Eα,l and Fα,l in (1)
and (2) respectively. The two-level flag system f distinguishes the accepting and aborting branches. The state
σα,P,lABE is the asymptotic state of the entanglement distillation protocol P and is of the form
σα,P,lABE =
 1∑
i,j=0
ωij(α,P) |Bij〉 〈Bij |AB ⊗ |ηij〉 〈ηij |E
⊗ σE (3)
where |ηij〉 are the leaked noise transcripts of Eve, |Bij〉 = (id ⊗ σjxσiz) |B00〉 the Bell-basis states, and ωij(α,P)
are probabilities which depend on the noise level of the local devices and the entanglement distillation protocol P.
For instance, if the local devices are perfect, then ωij = 1 if and only if i = j = 0, hence AB contains a perfect
Bell-pair. Finally, the states |ηij〉 specify the sequences of noise operations, and are orthogonal for different i, j.
If the noise transcripts are not leaked to Eve, we denote the ideal protocol by Fα. In that case, |ηij〉 in (3) is
not accessible to Eve, hence we replace σα,P,lABE by σ
α,P
ABE =
(∑
i,j ωij(α,P) |Bij〉 〈Bij |AB
)
⊗ σE in (2). Observe
that the ideal map Fα,l, which mathematically defines the type of process we wish to realize, is a global operation
beyond LOCC (local operations and classical communication) which can be decomposed by concatenating the real
protocol Eα,l and a replacement map S (which replaces the final state only if the real protocol succeeds according
to the system f in (2)), i.e. Fα,l = S ◦ Eα,l.
An entanglement distillation protocol (together with the noise maps), given as a CPTP map Eα,(l), is confidential
if it is close to the ideal map:
Definition 1. The protocol Eα,(l) is ε-confidential, if
‖(Eα,(l) ⊗ idE −Fα,(l) ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1 ≤ ε (4)
holds for all initial states |ψ〉ABE , where ‖ρ‖1 = tr
√
ρρ† is the operator 1-norm for a density operator ρ.
The system E above may contain any purification of the initial states Eve provided.
In this work, we use the term security in a generic sense, and the precise meaning depends on the context. For
instance, in QKD applications, security means that Alice and Bob establish a perfectly random and secret key
which the adversary has negligible information about [36, 37, 6, 5, 9, 35]. In recent times, composable security
definitions have become commonplace, in which, roughly speaking, security is defined via an ideal process, and
security level via the amount by which the process realized by the protocol deviates from the ideal process. In
the context of QKD, this distance reduces to the distance on the generated final states of the ideal vs. realized
protocol. The ideal protocol outputs a completely mixed state on Alice and Bobs system which is in tensor product
with Eve. More formally, see also [9], a QKD protocol Q is said to be ε−secure for initial state ρABE if
‖σSASBCE − σSS ⊗ σCE‖1 ≤ ε (5)
holds where σSASBCE = (Q⊗ idE)(ρABE), SA and SB denote the output systems of Alice and Bob (corresponding
the generated key), C denotes the classical communication and σSS = 1/|S|
∑
s∈S |s〉 〈s| ⊗ |s〉 〈s| for orthogonal
states s. The state σSS ⊗ σCE corresponds to the output of the ideal protocol.
The confidentiality criterion which we introduce here follows the distance-on-maps approach introduced in the
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context of QKD like in e.g. [8]. Observe that such an approach is especially tailored to compose different
protocols, as the confidentiality definition concerns the distance of the real process with respect to an ideal
process. Therefore the real and ideal maps Eα,(l) and Fα,(l) respectively are motivated by abstracting the protocol
in terms of processes. It is straightforward to abstract and define the ideal map in terms of input and output
relations, reflecting an ideal entanglement distillation process. As we discuss above, the ideal protocol has an
ok− and fail−branch. The fail−branch corresponds to the case whenever Alice and Bob abort the procedure,
outputting the state σ⊥ABE . However, if the procedure succeeds then we might think of the ideal map as running
the entanglement distillation protocol for infinitely many initial states, ending up in the fixed state σα,P,lABE of the
entanglement distillation protocol P for noise level α. We observe two important facts regarding that particular
state: first, its the best the entanglement distillation protocol P can do in the presence of noise of level α, and
second, as Eve is disentangled from Alice and Bob, this state is useful for applications like quantum teleportation.
Hence we refer to this state also as a private state, or equivalently, Alice and Bob share private entanglement. In
contrast to (5), the target state σα,P,lABE in the ok−branch is only in tensor product with respect to Eve if the noise
transcripts do not leak to the adversary. In that case a secure quantum channel is feasible in terms of quantum
teleportation. Otherwise, that is if the noise transcripts |ηij〉 leak to Eve, she is in a separable state with respect
to Alice and Bob, but still enabling for confidential applications. By confidential we mean here that when the final
state is used for quantum teleportation no information about the teleported state is leaked, but the final state does
not guarantee that Eve cannot change the teleported state. This observation motivates the term confidentiality
rather than security.
The classical communication is not correlated to the output of the real protocol, thus it can be ignored, see
Appendix A for details. The robustness of the protocol ∗ is considered in Appendix E, which enables us to assume
for the subsequent analysis that all basic distillation steps succeed.
4. Main contribution
We summarize the main findings of our paper as follows: recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols
prepended by a symmetrization and a system discarding step enable confidentiality, provided that the noise tran-
scripts do not leak to the adversary for all noise levels α for which distillation would be possible in the i.i.d. case.
We also show that this alone implies that the final state in the accepting branch, is close to a tensor product state
– Eve is factored out. The results regarding the BBPSSW protocol [28] are analytic whereas for the DEJMPS
protocol [19] the results rely on strong numerical evidence. For low noise rates, we achieve better results via the
post-selection-based reduction. In that case, no system discarding step is necessary. Finally we find that if an
entanglement distillation protocol is confidential when the noise transcripts do not leak, then it also confidential if
they do leak to the adversary. In particular, even in the case that Eve picks up information about all the realized
noise processes during the protocol, the final output system still enables confidential quantum applications like
e.g. quantum teleportation.
The paper proceeds as follows. We establish necessary conditions to guarantee confidentiality for recurrence-type
entanglement distillation protocols restricted to i.i.d. inputs whenever the noise transcripts are not leaked to Eve.
Then, we generalize this to arbitrary initial states via the de-Finetti theorem [25]. Next, we use them to prove
the confidentiality criterion (4) for entanglement distillation protocols where the noise transcripts are not leaked.
Finally, this will be used to derive the confidentiality bound whenever the noise transcripts are leaked.
5. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols
5.1. Entanglement distillation for i.i.d inputs
The basic step of a recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol is summarized as follows: Alice and Bob
share two noisy Bell-pairs, i.e. both have two qubits, each representing a ”half” of a noisy Bell pair, and they first
apply local operations to their respective parts of the Bell-pairs; next, they measure one Bell-pair and classically
communicate their outcomes. Depending on the entanglement distillation protocol and the outcomes they either
keep or discard the unmeasured pair. The basic step is applied to all pairs of the initial states, which comprises
one distillation round. This distillation round is iterated where output states of the previous round are used as
∗The robustness is quantified by the abort probability in the all-honest, but noisy setting.
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inputs for the next round. In the limit, a noiseless entanglement distillation protocol outputs a perfect Bell-pair
(implying that Eve is factored out).
Here, we allow for any type of noise acting (independently) on the single- and two-qubit gates appearing in the
protocol ∗. Using the results of [26], by utilizing random basis changes and adding additional noise, any such
general noise can be brought to a standard form: depolarizing noise for imperfect single- and two-qubit CNOT-
type operations, see Appendix A. Thus, it is sufficient to address noise in such standard form.
For such noise, one can analytically show [27] that for the BBPSSW protocol [28], there exists a unique attracting
fixed point of the protocol which only depends on the noise parameters. That is, whenever the fidelity of the
initial states is above some minimum fidelity Fmin, depending on the noise parameters, the protocol converges
towards that unique fixed point which we denote by σα;BAB . Observe that σ
α;B
AB is related to σ
α,P,l
ABE of (3) by letting
P = B and tracing out Eves system, i.e. σα;BAB = trE
[
σα,B,lABE
]
. In particular, we mean by P = B that the BBPSSW
protocol is used for entanglement distillation. We find that the output state σNAB , where N = log2 n denotes the
number of successfully completed distillation layers, satisfies ‖σNAB − σα;BAB ‖1 ≤ B, where B is a function of N ,
and it holds that B ≤ F (n) ∈ O
(
n−bB(α)
)
and 0 < bB(α) ≤ log2 3− 1.
For the entanglement distillation protocol of Deutsch et. al. [19] (referred to as the DEJMPS protocol) the
fixed point analysis is more complicated. In the noiseless case, DEJMPS was proven to have a unique attracting
fixed point [29]. For the noisy case, we can only provide extensive numerical evidence that there exists a unique
attracting fixed point, depending on the noise parameters only which we denote by σα;DAB , see Appendix A.1. Again,
observe that σα;DAB is related to σ
α,P,l
ABE of (3) by setting P = D and tracing out Eves system, i.e. σα;DAB = trE
[
σα,D,lABE
]
.
We numerically find that for the state σNAB obtained after successfully completing N = log2 n layers of distillation
that ‖σNAB − σα;DAB ‖1 ≤ D where D is a function of N , and it holds that D ≤ F (n) ∈ O
(
n−bD(α)
)
. bD(α) is
a positive function. We note that a similar analysis, but also with analytic findings for the noiseless DEJMPS
protocol was first performed in [29].
We reiterate that we assume for our analysis that all basic distillation steps succeed, since we deal with failures
due to the entanglement distillation protocol with a quadratic overhead in terms of initial states, see Appendix E.
The final state of the entanglement distillation protocol P in the ok−branch, σAB , depends on whether the
parameter estimation on
√
n initial states was accurate or not. The latter occurs with an exponentially small
probability in terms of initial states, see the discussion of the robustness of the protocol in Appendix E. This in
turn implies that the parameter estimation was accurate with probability exponentially close to unity. Therefore
the results regarding n i.i.d. initial states as input to the distillation protocol P above imply that
pρ‖σAB − σα;PAB ‖1 ≤ P(n) + 2pPE ≤ ′P(n) =: εP(n+
√
n) (6)
where pPE ∈ O(exp(−
√
n)) for all i.i.d. inputs ρ
⊗n+√n
AB . This equation attains exactly the same form for both
protocols with the difference in the labels, so if we substitute P with B (by writing, for example B(n)) we refer to
the BBPSSW protocol, where substituting P with D refers to the DEJMPS protocol. In similar fashion we refer
from now by P(n) to ′P(n) for the sake of clarity. So to summarize, the distance for n +
√
n i.i.d. initial states
in the ok−branch of the protocol is bounded by εP(n+
√
n).
Since, in the abort case, the outputs of the overall protocol Eα and the ideal protocol Fα are identical we obtain
that
‖(Eα −Fα)(ρ⊗nAB)‖1 = pρ‖σAB − σα;PAB ‖1 ≤ εP(n), (7)
where the probability pρ depends on the initial state ρ for both protocols and corresponds to the probability of
parameter estimation succeeding and completing log2(n −
√
n) distillation layers successfully for initial state ρ.
Hence, in both cases, the final distance to the respective fixed points scales polynomial in terms of n.
The functions bB(α) and bD(α) of the local noise level α govern the rate of convergence of the real protocol
to the ideal protocol in the i.i.d case for entanglement distillation protocols. We numerically found that these
functions monotonically increase as the local noise rate α tends to zero Appendix A. Thus, increasing the fidelity
of local devices (through e.g. fault tolerance) directly influences the rate of convergence, which in turn governs
the confidentiality level.
In contrast to bB(α), the function bD(α) is not upper bounded, which implies that for certain noise parameters
α the DEJMPS protocol needs to perform fewer distillation rounds than the BBPSSW protocol to achieve the
∗We assume that the noise characteristics of the quantum gates are constant throughout the protocol.
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required confidentiality levels. This fast convergence is crucial for the powerful post-selection technique [8] for non
i.i.d. initial states, which is not applicable for the BBPSSW protocol.
Now we use the established fixed point properties of entanglement distillation protocols for i.i.d. initial states to
show that similar results hold for arbitrary initial states.
5.2. Entanglement distillation for arbitrary inputs
In generalizing the previous results to arbitrary initial states we make use of the de Finetti theorem [25]. The
basic de-Finetti results guarantee that the reduced state trn−k
(
ρ
(n)
AB
)
of a permutation-invariant n−partite state
ρ
(n)
AB is close to an i.i.d state
∫
σ⊗kAB dσ, with distance which scales as O(k/n). This enables the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let n, k ∈ N where k ≤ n. Furthermore, let Es&t be the real protocol and Fs&t the ideal protocol
including symmetrization and the tracing out of n − k pairs. Moreover, let ρAB be a bipartite mixed state of n
systems shared by Alice and Bob and let E and F denote the real and ideal protocol after symmetrization and
tracing out n− k pairs. Then
‖Es&t(ρAB)−Fs&t(ρAB)‖1 ≤ 64k
n
+ max
µAB
‖E(µ⊗kAB)−F(µ⊗kAB)‖1 (8)
Proof. Let ρAB be a mixed state. After Alice and Bob apply a symmetrization they share a permutation
invariant state ρ˜AB . Thus we can apply Theorem II.7 of [25] and have for ξ
k
AB := trn−k [ρ˜AB ] the inequality
‖ξkAB −
∫
µ⊗kABdm(µAB)‖1 ≤ 32k/n for some probability measure m on the set of mixed states on AB. Moreover
we note that E and F are CPTP maps. We define τk :=
∫
µ⊗kABdm(µAB). A straightforward computation shows
‖Es&t(ρAB)−Fs&t(ρAB)‖1 = ‖E(ξkAB)−F(ξkAB)‖1 ≤ ‖E(ξkAB)− E(τk)‖1 + ‖E(τk)−F(ξkAB)‖1
≤ ‖E(ξkAB)− E(τk)‖1 + ‖E(τk)−F(τk)‖1 + ‖F(τk)−F(ξkAB)‖1
≤ 2‖τk − ξkAB‖1 + ‖E(τk)−F(τk)‖1 ≤
64k
n
+
∥∥∥∥(E − F)(∫ µ⊗kABdm(µAB))∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 64k
n
+ max
µAB
∥∥(E − F) (µ⊗kAB)∥∥1
which completes the proof.
Therefore the application of the de-Finetti theorem introduces an additive term 64kn when reducing arbitrary initial
states to i.i.d. initial states. As the right hand side of (8) is independent of the initial state ρAB , (8) holds for all
initial states ρAB .
In (8) we have omitted the superscript α characterizing the noise level, and we will use it only if it is specifically
needed. Inequality (8) implies that the properties of the fixed point (uniqueness, attractivity, noise-dependence)
also hold for arbitrary initial states, if the protocol is prepended by symmetrization and a trace-out step. This
enables us to prove the confidentiality criterion of Definition 1 for entanglement distillation protocols, where the
noise transcripts of L are not leaked, which will, in turn, imply the confidentiality criterion (4) whenever the noise
transcripts are leaked.
5.3. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols
The inequality in (7) establishes the local properties of the protocol, and is more-or-less typical for studies of
the convergence of entanglement distillation protocols in the i.i.d. case. However, it falls short of the complete
characterization captured by the confidentiality criterion (4) in two ways: first, the input states are restricted
(i.i.d.); second, it fails to consider the purifying system of Eve ∗, vital in cryptographic contexts. While the prior
issue is the subject of de-Finetti and post-selection-type reductions, the latter issue can be a problem in general,
as small distance of corresponding subsystems does not imply a small distance of the total systems.
However, we can resolve this issue by using the fixed point properties of entanglement distillation protocols. More
precisely, we relate the two distances by the following general Lemma, proven in Appendix B.1.
∗Technically, inequality (7) is a statement about the operator norm-induced distance on maps, where expression of (4) is the
completely bounded diamond norm, relevant for security statements.
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Lemma 3. Let ρ be an arbitrary mixed state shared by Alice and Bob and let |ψ〉ABE be a purification thereof held
by Eve. Furthermore, let P1 correspond to a (distillation-type) real protocol and P2 correspond to the associated
(distillation-type) ideal protocol, i.e.
P1(ρ) = pρσAB ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| ,
P2(ρ) = pρσαAB ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| .
where α characterizes the level of the noise, σαAB, and σ
⊥
AB are two fixed two qubit states. Furthermore, let P1 and
P2 satisfy the following properties:
(1) The noise transcripts do not leak to Eve.
(2) The protocol P1 guarantees to converge towards some state σαAB within the ok-branch of the protocol and
maxµAB ‖(P1 − P2)(µAB)‖1 ≤ ε.
Then it holds that
‖(P1 ⊗ idE − P2 ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1 ≤ (34 · 48 + 1)ε. (9)
The factor 34 ·48 +1 arises as an upper bound on the distance of the given states from states in product form based
on the notion of non-steerability we introduce (see Appendix B.1 for details). In our computations we managed
to prove the key lemma in a manner which is proportional to the dimension of the systems, more precisely, the
overall size of the corresponding density matrix. It may be the case that the bound of Lemma 3 could hold without
the dependence on the system size (and indeed, with smaller constants), however this was not necessary for our
purposes.
Lemma 3 is vital as it allows us to employ the de-Finetti theorem [25]. Hence, for the protocols Es&t and Fs&t,
by combining Lemma 2 with Lemma 3, we obtain the following Theorem.
Theorem 4 (de-Finetti-based reduction technique). Let Es&t be the real protocol and Fs&t the ideal protocol
including symmetrization and the tracing out of n − k pairs, taking n input pairs and k ≤ n and utilizing
entanglement distillation protocol P. Then we have
max
|ψ〉ABE
‖(Es&t ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)− (Fs&t ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 ≤ (34 · 48 + 1)
(
64k
n
+ εP(k)
)
(10)
where εP(k) denotes the maximum distance of the real and ideal protocol without symmetrization and tracing out
step using entanglement distillation protocol P in the ok−branch for k i.i.d. initial states, i.e. Eq. (7).
Proof. Suppose Eve prepares a purification |ψ〉ABE of the state ρAB shared by Alice and Bob. Recall that the real
and ideal protocol including symmetrization and the tracing out of n− k pairs applied to initial state ρAB read as
Es&t(ρAB) = pρσAB ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| ,
Fs&t(ρAB) = pρσα,PAB ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail|
and observe that we have for the initial state ρAB by Lemma 2 that
‖(Es&t −Fs&t)(ρAB)‖1 = pρ‖σAB − σα,PAB ‖1 ≤
(
64k
n
+ max
µAB
∥∥(E − F) (µ⊗kAB)∥∥1) (11)
where E and F denote the real and ideal protocol after symmetrization and tracing out n − k pairs. Since the
right-hand side of (11) is independent of the initial state ρAB it holds for all initial states of the protocol. Therefore,
the properties of the fixed point (unique, attracting and depending on the noise parameters only) translate from
i.i.d. initial states to arbitrary initial states. Hence the protocol guarantees that it converges towards the fixed
point of the entanglement distillation protocol.
Additionally, by inserting (7) in (11) we find
‖(Es&t −Fs&t)(ρAB)‖1 ≤
(
64k
n
+ εP(k)
)
. (12)
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This implies that the real protocol indeed converges towards the fixed point, and, thus we can apply Lemma 3 to
the protocols Es&t and Fs&t for the purification |ψ〉ABE of ρAB and we find by using (12) that
‖(Es&t ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)− (Fs&t ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 ≤ (34 · 48 + 1)
(
64k
n
+ εP(k)
)
. (13)
Taking the maximum in (13) completes the proof.
Thus, we can reach arbitrary confidentiality levels, however at the cost of wasting some pairs. The scaling of the
confidentiality parameter, i.e. the right-hand side of (10), is linear in the number of initial states n, due to the use
of the “basic” de Finetti approach.
If the local noise is low, we can do better in terms of scaling and efficiency, using the post-selection technique [8].
For that purpose, we first establish a result similar to (9) by using the fact that the resulting state of the protocol,
including L, is pure, see Appendix A. More precisely, we have the following Lemma, proven in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 5. Let E be the real protocol which guarantees to converge towards a unique and attracting fixed point
depending on the noise parameter only and let F be the ideal protocol. Furthermore let ρ be a mixed state
(consisting of n systems) shared by Alice and Bob. If the extension of E and F to the system of L satisfies
‖EL(ρ)−FL(ρ)‖1 ≤ ε(n), then
‖(E ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)− (F ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε(n)
for all purifications |ψ〉ABE′ of ρ.
This Lemma allows us to prove the closeness on any purification from the closeness of the reduced systems, and
finally to derive confidentiality from the performance of the ideal protocol via the following Theorem.
Theorem 6 (Post-selection-based reduction technique). Let Es be the real protocol and Fs the ideal protocol
preceded by a symmetrization step operating on n input pairs. Furthermore let maxµAB ‖E(µ⊗nAB) − F(µ⊗nAB)‖1 ≤
εP(n), see (7), where E and F denote the sub-protocols after symmetrization (i.e. the protocols without the
symmetrization step) and P the entanglement distillation protocol. Then we have
max
|ψ〉ABE′
‖(Es ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)− (Fs ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 ≤ 4
√
2gn,d
4
√
εP(n) (14)
where gn,d =
(
n+15
n
)
.
Proof. We observe that Es and Fs are permutation invariant maps due to the symmetrizazion step. Thus we can
apply the post-selection technique of [8] which implies
max
|ψ〉ABE′
‖(Es ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)− (Fs ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 ≤ gn,d‖(Es ⊗ idE′)(|τ〉 〈τ |ABE′)− (Fs ⊗ idE′)(|τ〉 〈τ |ABE′)‖1
(15)
where |τ〉ABE′ is a purification of the de-Finetti Hilbert-Schmidt state, hence trE′ [|τ〉 〈τ |ABE′ ] =
∫
µ⊗nABdη(µ) =: τ
′
where η is the measure induced by the Hilbert-Schmidt metric on End(C4). Furthermore, we note that we have
for the extensions of Es and Fs to L, i.e. the maps EsL and FsL, that
‖EsL(τ ′)−FsL(τ ′)‖1 =
∥∥∥∥(EsL −FsL)(∫ µ⊗nABdη(µ))∥∥∥∥
1
≤ max
µAB
∥∥(EL −FL) (µ⊗nAB)∥∥1 . (16)
According to Appendix A.1.1, which implies that the distance including L scales as the square root of the
1−norm induced distance without L, i.e. Alice and Bob only, we find for (16) by using the assumption
maxµAB ‖E(µ⊗nAB)−F(µ⊗nAB)‖1 ≤ εP(n) that∥∥(EL −FL) (µ⊗nAB)∥∥1 ≤ 2√∥∥(E − F) (µ⊗nAB)∥∥1 ≤ 2√εP(n). (17)
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As |τ〉ABE′ is a purification of τ ′ we can apply Lemma 5 which gives, for (15),
max
|ψ〉ABE′
‖(Es ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)− (Fs ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 ≤ 4gn,d
√
max
µAB
∥∥(EL −FL) (µ⊗nAB)∥∥1
≤ 4gn,d
√
2
√
εP(n)
= 4
√
2gn,d
4
√
εP(n)
which completes the proof.
Observe that εP(n), which governs the rate of convergence of the overall protocol, relates to the rate of convergence
of the entanglement distillation protocol P via εP(n) = P(n −
√
n), as
√
n initial states are used for parameter
estimation.
We remind the reader that the preprocessing steps (symmetrization, tracing out) of the entanglement distillation
protocol and the Lemmas of this section are non-trivial and crucial for the proof of the de-Finetti-based and
post-selection-based reduction technique.
Furthermore we point out that the proof regarding the BBPSSW protocol is analytic and necessarily relies on the
de-Finetti-based reduction technique because of its slow convergence rate. The rate of convergence for the BBPSSW
protocol can easily be derived, see Appendix A for details. For the DEJMPS protocol it turns out that we have
polynomial scaling depending on the noise parameter α, i.e. maxσAB
∥∥(E − F) (σ⊗nAB)∥∥1 ≤ εD(n) ≤ O(n−bD(α)),
see (7).
However, the protocol needs to converge sufficiently quickly, as the post-selection technique incurs a multiplicative
increase in the effective distance between real and ideal protocols, which scales as a (15 degree) polynomial in n, see
(14). The resulting confidentiality level scales therefore as O(n15−bD(α)/4), which leads to an acceptable noise level
that is rather low, e.g. about 10−19 for the DEJMPS protocol in the setting of binary pairs ∗, see Appendix A.1.1.
This very low rate is due to the polynomial factor introduced by applying the post-selection technique, i.e. gn,d
in (14) with d = 4. Observe that these small rates are determined by properties of recurrence-type entanglement
distillation protocols, i.e. b(α) for the recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols studied here, and may
be improved by either considering hashing-type protocols [30] or through fault-tolerant constructions. Indeed, the
noise threshold for fault-tolerant quantum computation also applies to this case, yielding a tolerable noise level of
about 10−4. We reiterate that the post-selection technique is not applicable to the BBPSSW protocol, due to its
slow convergence.
5.4. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols when the noise transcripts leak
Finally, we provide confidentiality guarantees for entanglement distillation protocols when the noise transcripts are
leaked to Eve. For that purpose, we relate the confidentiality criterion (4) for protocols where the noise transcripts
are leaked to the earlier results. More formally, we have the following Theorem.
Theorem 7. Let E be the real protocol and F be the ideal protocol satisfying the assumptions of Lemma 3.
Furthermore, let E l denote the real and F l the ideal protocol when the noise transcripts leak to Eve. Then
‖(E ⊗ idE −F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 ≤ ε(n) , implies (18)
‖(E l ⊗ idE −F l ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 ≤ 2
√
ε(n)
for all purifications |ψ〉ABE of initial state ρAB consisting of n systems.
The proof, see Appendix C, uses the unitary equivalence of purifications. Theorem 7 establishes via (18) that if an
entanglement distillation protocol is ε−confidential according to Definition 1 then the protocol is 2√ε−confidential
if the noisy apparatus leaks the noise transcripts.
∗For this simplified analysis we assumed that no parameter estimation is necessary.
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6. Discussion
We have shown that recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols ensure private entanglement without
referring to the asymptotic limit. This holds true even when the local devices are noisy, and when the potential
eavesdropper is able to completely monitor the operation of these devices in run-time (i.e., the noisy apparatus
leaks information about the realized noise processes). If the noise transcripts are not leaked, Eve is “factored out”
– in tensor product with Alice and Bob, and only classically correlated otherwise. Our protocol can, for instance,
be used to realize confidential quantum channels by means of teleportation - the only information that may leak
to Eve after teleportation is which noise map was applied to the sent state, but nothing about the state itself (see
Appendix F for details). More generally, our results imply the confidentiality of the protocols in arbitrary settings
(beyond the application to quantum channels), thus opening the way for the confidential realization of various
quantum tasks: from establishing quantum channels and quantum networks, to applications such as distributed
quantum computation. Aside from cryptographic aspects, the proposed protocol can be used to generate high
quality entanglement from non-iid sources.
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Appendix A. Entanglement distillation for i.i.d. inputs
Appendix A.1. The DEJMPS protocol
We first provide an overview of the DEJMPS protocol [19] and then extend the description incrementally to our
proposed setting (including L and Eve).
The DEJMPS protocol is a recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol which combines several noisy
copies of a mixed state ρ to distill a state arbitrarily close to the maximally entangled state |B00〉 , where
|Bij〉 = (id ⊗ σjxσiz)(|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2 for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1}, provided that the fidelity F = 〈B00| ρ |B00〉
satisfies F > 1/2 for the noiseless case. If the apparatus is noisy, then the minimal required fidelity F needs to
satisfy F > Fmin (where Fmin depends on the noise level of the apparatus) to achieve distillation. For more details
on recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols in general we refer the interested reader to [31]. A basic
step of the DEJMPS protocol is as follows:
Protocol 1: Basic step of the DEJMPS protocol
Require: Input state of Alice and Bob: ρ(a1,b1) ⊗ ρ(a2,b2)
1: Alice and Bob apply the local basis change Ux = e
−ipi/4σ(a1)x ⊗ eipi/4σ(b1)x ⊗ e−ipi/4σ(a2)x ⊗ eipi/4σ(b2)x :
Ux
(
ρ(a1,b1) ⊗ ρ(a2,b2)
)
U†x.
2: Alice and Bob apply a bilateral CNOT (BCNOT):
(CNOTa1→a2 ⊗ CNOTb1→b2) ρ(a1,b1) ⊗ ρ(a2,b2) (CNOTa1→a2 ⊗ CNOTb1→b2)† .
3: Alice and Bob apply a σ
(a2)
z = σz ⊗ id and a σ(b2)z = id⊗ σz measurement
4: Alice and Bob communicate their measurement outcomes, za and zb respectively, over a classical authentic
channel
5: if za = zb then
6: Alice and Bob keep the subsystems a1 and b1 of step 2
7: Alice and Bob discard the measured subsystems a2 and b2
8: else
9: Alice and Bob discard both pairs
10: end if
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Hence, we can write one basic distillation step of the DEJMPS protocol as the linear map O2-EPP(ρ ⊗ ρ) =
O′2-EPP(ρ⊗ ρ)O′†2-EPP where
O′2-EPP =
(
ida1,b1 ⊗ P (a2)z ⊗ P (b2)z
)
(CNOTa1→a2 ⊗ CNOTb1→b2)Ux
modulo a normalization factor and where Pz = |z〉 〈z| , z ∈ {0, 1} denotes the respective outcome of step 3 of
Protocol 1.
The basic step is applied to all initial pairs, which comprises one distillation round. This distillation round is
iterated where output states of the previous round are used as inputs for the next round. So we summarize the
DEJMPS protocol as follows:
Protocol 2: DEJMPS protocol
Require: Input state of Alice and Bob:
⊗2n
i=1 ρ
(ai,bi) where F = 〈B00| ρ(ai,bi) |B00〉 > 1/2 for all i ∈ {1, .., 2n}
1: while Pairs left for distillation do
2: Apply Protocol 1 to all pairs
3: Use the outputs of the previous step as input for the next distillation round
4: end while
We remind the reader that the recurrence relations of the protocol (i.e. update functions of the coefficients of an
ensemble) are central for the convergence analysis of the DEJMPS protocol. For Bell-diagonal states, i.e. states
of the form
ρ = p00 |B00〉 〈B00| + p11 |B11〉 〈B11| + p01 |B01〉 〈B01| + p10 |B10〉 〈B10|
where
∑
ij pij = 1, pij ≥ 0, a straightforward computation yields the recurrence relations for the DEJMPS protocol
to be
p˜00 =
p200 + p
2
11
N
, p˜11 =
2p01p10
N
,
p˜01 =
p201 + p
2
10
N
, p˜10 =
2p00p11
N
(A.1)
where N = (p00 + p11)
2 + (p01 + p10)
2, see e.g. [19].
In [29] it has been shown analytically that the recurrence relations (A.1) converge towards a unique and attracting
fixed point provided the initial fidelity with |B00〉, p00, is above 1/2.
The recurrence relations of the DEJMPS protocol taking independent single qubit white noise, i.e. noise of the
form Nρ = fρ+ (1− f)/4(ρ+ σxρσx + σyρσy + σzρσz) acting on each qubit of Alice into account, read far more
complex. In the presence of noise we have strong numerical evidence that the DEJMPS protocol converges towards
a unique and attracting fixed point depending on the noise level f only.
From figure A1 we suggest a linear relationship between log ‖ρfix − ρn‖1 (where ρfix and ρn denote the fixed
point and the state after successfully completing n distillation rounds respectively) and the number of successful
distillation rounds n. We immediately observe that the slope only depends on the noise parameter f , i.e. we have
that
log ‖ρfix − ρn‖1 = a(f)− nb(f).
Using log2N = n, where N denotes the number of input pairs, this implies ‖ρfix − ρn‖1 = ea(f)e−b(f) log2N =
a′(f)N−b
′(f), i.e. ‖ρfix − ρn‖1 scales as F (N) ∈ O(N−b′(f)) as mentioned in the main text. Furthermore we
numerically find that the function b′(f) monotonically grows for f → 1.
For two qubit correlated noise, we refer the reader to the analysis including L, as the fixed point and the scaling
can be recovered from that analysis by tracing out the system of L.
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Figure A1. The figure illustrates log ‖ρfix−ρn‖1 for different noise parameters f = 0.97 (blue), f = 0.98 (green)
and f = 0.99 (red). The fixed point ρfix was evaluated for 500 iterations of the DEJMPS protocol.
Appendix A.1.1. Detailed analysis including L We outline the remainder of this section as follows: First we derive
the recurrence relations of the DEJMPS protocol in the most general setting, taking the noise applied by L into
account as well as assuming that Eve receives the leaked noise transcripts of L. We use those recurrence relations
in the next subsection to provide analytical results regarding the fixed point of the recurrence relations, where the
inputs are binary pairs and L only applies either id or σx operators. We close the section with numerical results
for general i.i.d. Bell-diagonal pairs and the most general noise maps of L.
The recurrence relations
For i.i.d. input states the state of each system subject to distillation at an intermediate distillation round of
the DEJMPS protocol is of the form |Ψ〉ABEL =
∑
i,j,k,l Pijkl |Bij〉AB |kl〉L |ijkl〉E , where Pijkl are probability
amplitudes, if we assume the noise is leaked to Eve after every distillation round. The system AB models the pair
of Alice and Bob, L the system of L (where the content of the register corresponds to the effective noise introduced
to AB) and E the system of Eve. L applies the noise processes before a basic protocol step to the systems of
Alice. Moreover, L keeps track of the effective noise introduced using its system in a sense we clarify later.
In the following we use the notation
σ0,0 = id, σ0,1 = σx, σ1,0 = σz, σ1,1 = σy
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for the four Pauli-operators. Furthermore we denote by superscripts in brackets particle labels and by superscripts
without brackets the power of an operator.
L introduces the noise maps Uα1,β1,α2,β2 = U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2 where U
(ak)
α,β = σ
(ak)
α,β ⊗
(
(σαx )⊗ (σβx )
)(Lk). We observe
that applying the noise map Uα1,β1,α2,β2 might flip the contents of the registers L1 and L2 depending on the values
of α1, β1, α2 and β2. This enables L to keep track of the noise introduced to a pair.
There are two approaches how L can apply the noise maps Uα1,β1,α2,β2 : stochastically in terms of CPTP maps,
or coherently in terms of unitaries acting on an enlarged Hilbert space. Here we assume the latter approach, but
provide the analysis of the noisy DEJMPS protocol in terms of CPTP maps and purifications.
To show that these are equivalent, first suppose that L owns a register H set to the state∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
√
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2 |α1β1α2β2〉H where f˜α1,β1,α2,β2 are the probabilities of applying the respective noise
map Uα1,β1,α2,β2 . L uses the register H to apply the noise maps Uα1,β1,α2,β2 coherently controlled to the input
state |Ψ〉ABEL. We observe that tracing out H after applying all the noise maps Uα1,β1,α2,β2 in a controlled fashion
yields ∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2Uα1,β1,α2,β2 (|Ψ〉 〈Ψ| ⊗ |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|)U†α1,β1,α2,β2 .
On the other hand, assume that L applies the noise process in terms of a CPTP map N , i.e.
Nρ =
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2Uα1,β1,α2,β2 (|Ψ〉 〈Ψ| ⊗ |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|)U†α1,β1,α2,β2 .
We observe that Nρ will be, in general, a mixed state, thus there exists a purification on a larger Hilbert space.
As all purifications are unitarily equivalent, see e.g. [32], we choose the purification
|Φ〉 =
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
√
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2Uα1,β1,α2,β2 |Ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψ〉 ⊗ |α1β1α2β2〉H .
Hence trH [|Φ〉 〈Φ|] = Nρ. Furthermore, we observe that the pure state |Φ〉 can be generated
by applying the unitaries Uα1,β1,α2,β2 , coherently controlled by the register H, to |Ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψ〉 ⊗(∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
√
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2 |α1β1α2β2〉H
)
.
This equivalence allows us to assume that L introduces the noise as a CPTP map, applying Uα1,β1,α2,β2 with
respective probabilities fα1,β1,α2,β2 and purifying the state after the basic distillation step is executed by Alice and
Bob.
Since the noise of L is applied before the basic distillation step is executed by Alice and Bob, the result of one
noisy distillation step reads as
ρ′ =
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2UuO
′
2-EPP(U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2) (|Ψ〉 〈Ψ| ⊗ |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|) (U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2)†O
′†
2-EPPU
†
u (A.2)
which needs finally to be purified.
In order to evaluate (A.2), we proceed as follows:
• Step 1: We first compute
O′2-EPP(U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2) |Ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψ〉 .
which corresponds to the state after the noise map U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2 is applied by L and the basic distillation
step of the entanglement distillation protocol is executed by Alice and Bob.
• Step 2: We apply the unitary Uu, which acts only on L’s systems and whose purpose we clarify later, to the
previous equality.
• Step 3: We have to determine the purification held by Eve if the noise is leaked to her. In doing so, we trace
out Eve and then provide her with the purification of the resulting state (which corresponds to leaking the
noise transcripts to Eve).
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Step 1: We observe that applying the noise map U
(a1)
α,β to |Ψ〉 yields
U
(a1)
α,β |Ψ〉 = U (a1)α,β
∑
i,j,k,l
Pijkl |Bij〉AB |kl〉L |ijkl〉E (A.3)
=
∑
i,j,k,l
Pijkl
∣∣B(i⊕α)(j⊕β)〉AB |(k ⊕ α)(l ⊕ β)〉L |ijkl〉E
=
∑
i,j,k,l
P(i⊕α)(j⊕β)(k⊕α)(l⊕β) |Bij〉AB |kl〉L |(i⊕ α)(j ⊕ β)(k ⊕ α)(l ⊕ β)〉E .
This observation suggests the following notational simplifications:
Pαβijkl = P(i⊕α)(j⊕β)(k⊕α)(l⊕β) and
∣∣∣eαβijkl〉
E
= |(i⊕ α)(j ⊕ β)(k ⊕ α)(l ⊕ β)〉E .
Using this notation we rewrite (A.3) as U
(a1)
α,β |Ψ〉 =
∑
i,j,k,l P
αβ
ijkl |Bij〉AB |kl〉L
∣∣∣eαβijkl〉
E
. This is the state of Alice,
Bob, L, and Eve after the noise map U
(a1)
α,β is applied by L to the first pair. In order to compute (A.2) we define∣∣Ψ′′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 = (U (a1)α1,β1 ⊗ U (a2)α2,β2) |Ψ〉 |Ψ〉
=
∑
i1,j1,i2,j2
∑
k1,l1,k2,l2
Aα1β1i1j1k1l1P
α2β2
i2j2k2l2
|Bi1j1〉AB1 |Bi2j2〉AB2 |k1l1〉L1 |k2l2〉L2
⊗
∣∣∣eα1β1i1j1k1l1〉E1
∣∣∣eα2β2i2j2k2l2〉E2
which corresponds to the state after the noise map U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2 is applied and∣∣Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 = UuO2-EPP ∣∣Ψ′′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 (A.4)
which is the state after the noise map U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2 , one basic distillation step and the update of L’s noise
register by Uu. Thus we rewrite (A.2) as
ρ′ =
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2
∣∣Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 〈Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2∣∣ . (A.5)
According to (A.4) Alice and Bob apply one basic distillation step of the DEJMPS protocol to the state∣∣∣Ψ′′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 . Recall that step 1 of Protocol 1 maps |Bij〉 to ∣∣Bi(i⊕j)〉 and that step 2 maps |Bij〉 |Bi′j′〉
to
∣∣B(i⊕i′)j〉 ∣∣Bi′(j⊕j′)〉 . Thus we conclude that after step 1 and 2 of Protocol 1 the state of Alice, Bob, L, and
Eve is ∑
i1,j1,i2,j2
∑
k1,l1,k2,l2
Pα1β1i1j1k1l1P
α2β2
i2j2k2l2
∣∣B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)〉AB1 ∣∣Bi2(i1⊕j1⊕i2⊕j2)〉AB2 |k1l1〉L1 |k2l2〉L2∣∣∣eα1β1i1j1k1l1〉E1
∣∣∣eα2β2i2j2k2l2〉E2 (A.6)
Following Protocol 1, a σz-measurement of the target pair of the BCNOT, i.e. the subsystem AB2, is applied to
(A.6). Next Alice and Bob communicate their respective measurement outcomes over a classic authentic channel.
If the measurement outcomes coincide, Alice and Bob keep the source pair, i.e. subsystem AB1 of step 2, else
they discard both subsystems AB1 and AB2. We assume that both measurements yield the outcome 1. If both
measurement outcomes yield 0, no phase factor (−1)i2 would be required in the expression (A.7). The coinciding
measurement outcomes imply i1 ⊕ j1 ⊕ i2 ⊕ j2 = 0. To summarize, the state post-selected on the measurement
outcomes 1 of Alice and Bob is∑
i1,j1,i2,j2
∑
k1,l1,k2,l2
(−1)i2Pα1β1i1j1k1l1P
α2β2
i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2
∣∣B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)〉AB1 |k1l1〉L1 |k2l2〉L2 ∣∣∣eα1β1i1j1k1l1〉E1
∣∣∣eα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2〉E2 .
(A.7)
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Step 2: Recall that L stores in its register attached to the pair of Alice and Bob the effective noise introduced. For
that purpose we introduce the unitary Uu as well as an ancilla system L3 set to the state |00〉L3 . Applying Uu
to all three registers of L yields Uu |00〉 |i〉 |j〉 |i′〉 |j′〉 = |u(i, j, i′, j′)〉 |i〉 |j〉 |i′〉 |j′〉 where u is the so called flag
update function defined in [20]. The function u returns the effective noise introduced on the source pair of step 2
of Protocol 1. Applying Uu to (A.7) gives∣∣Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 = ∑
i1,j1,i2,j2
∑
k1,l1,k2,l2
(−1)i2Pα1β1i1j1k1l1P
α2β2
i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2
∣∣B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)〉AB1 |k1l1〉L1 |k2l2〉L2 |u(k1, l1, k2, l2)〉L3
⊗
∣∣∣eα1β1i1j1k1l1〉E1
∣∣∣eα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2〉E2 .
We remind the reader that
∣∣∣Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 is the state after the application of i) the noise map U (a1)α1,β1 ⊗U (a2)α2,β2 , ii)
a basic distillation step, and iii) the update of L’s noise register by Uu.
Step 3: Since the noise transcripts - by assumption for this analysis - leak to Eve, we attribute the systems L1 and
L2 to Eve. In order to treat the most general situation, we assume that Eve holds a purification of trL1,L2,E1,E2 [ρ
′].
We determine this purification by computing ρ′1 = trL1,L2 [ρ
′] and ρ′2 = trE1,E2 [ρ
′
1] and attribute the purification
of ρ′2 to Eve.
By the linearity of the partial trace we have
ρ′1 = trL1,L2 [ρ
′] =
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2trL1,L2
[∣∣Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 〈Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2∣∣] .
It is useful to define ρ′α1,β1,α2,β2 = trL1,L2
[∣∣∣Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2〉〈Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2∣∣∣] which evaluates to
ρ′α1,β1,α2,β2 = trL1,L2
[∣∣Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2〉 〈Ψ′α1,β1,α2,β2 ∣∣]
=
∑
(−1)i2⊕i′2Pα1β1i1j1k1l1P
α2β2
i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2(P
α1β1
i′1j
′
1k1l1
Pα2β2i′2(i′1⊕j′1⊕i′2)k2l2)
∗ ∣∣B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)〉 〈B(i′1⊕i′2)(i′1⊕j′1)∣∣
⊗ |u(k1, l1, k2, l2)〉 〈u(k1, l1, k2, l2)| ⊗
∣∣∣eα1β1i1j1k1l1〉〈eα1β1i′1j′1k1l1∣∣∣ ⊗ ∣∣∣eα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2〉〈eα2β2i′2(i′1⊕j′1⊕i′2)k2l2 ∣∣∣ .
In the previous expression we neglected the indices appearing in the sum for simplicity, but it is understood that
the sum ranges over all indices except α1, β1, α2 and β2.
In order to determine the state of Alice, Bob, and L which Eve finally purifies we have to compute ρ′2 = trE1,E2 [ρ
′
1].
Again, the linearity of the partial trace yields
ρ′2 = trE1,E2 [ρ
′
1] =
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2trE1,E2
[
ρ′α1,β1,α2,β2
]
. (A.8)
We remind the reader that
∣∣∣eαβijkl〉
E1
= |(i⊕ α)(j ⊕ β)(k ⊕ α)(l ⊕ β)〉E1 . Hence, for fixed α1 and β1, we have
tr
∣∣∣eα1β1i1j1k1l1〉〈eα1β1i′1j′1k1l1 ∣∣∣ = δi1i′1δj1j′1 , which implies that i′1 = i1 and j′1 = j1. Thus, we also have
tr
∣∣∣eα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2〉〈eα2β2i′2(i′1⊕j′1⊕i′2)k2l2∣∣∣ = tr∣∣∣eα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2〉〈eα2β2i′2(i1⊕j1⊕i′2)k2l2∣∣∣ = δi2i′2 .
Hence
trE1,E2
[
ρ′α1,β1,α2,β2
]
=
=
∑
i1,i2,j1
∑
k1,l1,k2,l2
Pα1β1i1j1k1l1P
α2β2
i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2(P
α1β1
i1j1k1l1
Pα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2)
∗
∣∣B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)〉 〈B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)∣∣ ⊗ |u(k1, l1, k2, l2)〉 〈u(k1, l1, k2, l2)|
=
∑
i1,i2,j1
∑
k1,l1,k2,l2
∣∣∣Pα1β1i1j1k1l1Pα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2∣∣∣2∣∣B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)〉 〈B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)∣∣ ⊗ |u(k1, l1, k2, l2)〉 〈u(k1, l1, k2, l2)| . (A.9)
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By inserting (A.9) in (A.8) we get
ρ′2 = trE1,E2 [ρ
′
1]
=
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2trE1,E2
[
ρ′α1,β1,α2,β2
]
=
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2
∑
i1,i2,j1
∑
k1,l1,k2,l2
∣∣∣Pα1β1i1j1k1l1Pα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2 ∣∣∣2∣∣B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)〉 〈B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)∣∣ ⊗ |u(k1, l1, k2, l2)〉 〈u(k1, l1, k2, l2)|
=
∑
i1,i2,j1
∣∣B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)〉 〈B(i1⊕i2)(i1⊕j1)∣∣ ⊗∑
γ0,γ1
 ∑
α1,β1,α2,β2,k1,l1,k2,l2
u(k1,l1,k2,l2)=(γ0,γ1)
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2
∣∣∣Pα1β1i1j1k1l1Pα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2∣∣∣2

|γ0γ1〉 〈γ0γ1| .
Rearranging the sum over i1, i2 and j1 in the previous equation gives
∑
δ0,δ1
|Bδ0δ1〉 〈Bδ0δ1 | ⊗
∑
γ0,γ1
 ∑
i1,i2,j1
i1⊕i2=δ0,i1⊕j1=δ1
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2,k1,l1,k2,l2
u(k1,l1,k2,l2)=(γ0,γ1)
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2
∣∣∣Pα1β1i1j1k1l1Pα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2 ∣∣∣2
 (A.10)
|γ0γ1〉 〈γ0γ1| .
Using the definition
|P˜δ0δ1γ0γ1 |2 =
∑
i1,i2,j1
i1⊕i2=δ0,i1⊕j1=δ1
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2,k1,l1,k2,l2
u(k1,l1,k2,l2)=(γ0,γ1)
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2
∣∣∣Pα1β1i1j1k1l1Pα2β2i2(i1⊕j1⊕i2)k2l2 ∣∣∣2 (A.11)
where δ0, δ1, γ0, γ1 ∈ {0, 1} and omitting the normalization factor for clarity, (A.10) simplifies to∑
δ0,δ1
|Bδ0δ1〉 〈Bδ0δ1 | ⊗
∑
γ0,γ1
|P˜δ0δ1γ0γ1 |2 |γ0γ1〉 〈γ0γ1|
which is the state of Alice, Bob, and L after one noisy distillation step. Since this final state is purified by Eve
with the leaked noise transcripts and all purifications are unitarily equivalent, the state of Alice, Bob, L, and Eve
after one noisy distillation step can be written without loss of generality as∣∣ψDEJMPS〉 = ∑
δ0,δ1,γ0,γ1
P˜δ0,δ1,γ0,γ1 |Bδ0,δ1〉AB |γ0γ1〉L |δ0δ1γ0γ1〉E .
This also implies that (A.11) are the recurrence relations of the noisy DEJMPS protocol.
Fixed point and convergence - Binary pairs
First we study the scaling of the systems of Alice, Bob, and L and extend those results then to the (possibly
leaked) noise transcripts of Eve in terms of purifications.
Suppose that the initial i.i.d. pairs of Alice and Bob are mixtures of |B00〉 and |B01〉 and that L applies either the
identity or a σx-operator with respective probabilities f˜0 and f˜1 = 1−f˜0 independently to each pair. We remind the
reader that Eve purifies the state of Alice, Bob, and L with the leaked noise transcripts, i.e. each individual state
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taking Eve into account at an intermediate round of the DEJMPS protocol reads as
∑
i,j Pij |B0i〉AB⊗|ηj〉L⊗|ηij〉E .
Using pij = |Pij |2, the recurrence relations (A.11) for the setting we are concerned with here simplify to
p˜00 = 1/N(f˜
2
0
(
p200 + 2p00p01
)
+ f˜21
(
p211 + 2p10p11
)
+ 2f˜0f˜1 (p11p00 + p10p00 + p11p01)), (A.12)
p˜01 = 1/N(f˜
2
0 p
2
01 + 2f˜0f˜1p10p01 + f˜
2
1 p
2
10), (A.13)
p˜10 = 1/N(f˜
2
0
(
p210 + 2p10p11
)
+ f˜21
(
p201 + 2p00p01
)
+ 2f˜0f˜1 (p01p10 + p00p10 + p01p11)), (A.14)
p˜11 = 1/N(f˜
2
0 p
2
11 + 2f˜0f˜1p00p11 + f˜
2
1 p
2
00). (A.15)
where N = (f˜20 + f˜
2
1 )((p00 + p01)
2 + (p10 + p11)
2) + 4f˜0f˜1(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11). In the following we denote the
recurrence relations (A.12)–(A.15) by the vector-valued mapping f , i.e. p
f→ p˜, where p = (p00, p01, p10, p11). A
simple computation yields the following fixed points of f :
p∞00 = 1/2 +
√
4f˜0 − 3/(4f˜0 − 2) p∞01 = p∞10 = 0 p∞11 = 1− p∞00, (A.16)
p∞00 = 1/2−
√
4f˜0 − 3/(4f˜0 − 2) p∞01 = p∞10 = 0 p∞11 = 1− p∞00, (A.17)
p∞00 = p
∞
11 = 1/2 p
∞
01 = p
∞
10 = 0. (A.18)
The parameter estimation phase guarantees that the fidelity F with |B00〉 is sufficiently high for distillation. Hence
the fixed point of interested is (A.16), i.e.
p∞ = (1/2 +
√
4f˜0 − 3/(4f˜0 − 2), 0, 0, 1/2−
√
4f˜0 − 3/(4f˜0 − 2)). (A.19)
From (A.19) we observe that in the limit the ‘cross-probabilities’ p01 and p10, vanish, hence L is fully correlated
to AB.
It is of central importance, regarding convergence that the fixed point p∞ is an attractor, as only this ensures
convergence towards that fixed point. Note that p∞ is an attractor if and only if the largest eigenvalue λmax of
f ′(p∞) satisfies λmax < 1. We easily find that λmax = (f˜0
√
4f˜0 − 3− f˜0)/(2f˜0 − 1) < 1 for 0.78 ≤ f˜0 ≤ 1.
The fixed point p∞ enables us to determine the rate of convergence. For that purpose, we expand f in
terms of its Taylor series around the fixed point p∞, i.e. p˜ = f(p) ≈ f(p∞) + f ′(p∞)(p − p∞). Hence by
defining e = p − p∞ we find e˜ = f ′(p∞)e, providing an estimate of the error propagation for one successful
distillation round. The state of Alice, Bob, and L after n successful distillation rounds and at the fixpoint read as
ρn =
∑
ij p
(n)
ij |B0i〉 〈B0i|AB ⊗ |ηj〉 〈ηj |L and ρfix =
∑
i p
∞
ii |B0i〉 〈B0i|AB ⊗ |ηi〉 〈ηi|L respectively, which implies for
their distance induced by the 1-norm
n = ‖ρn − ρfix‖1 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i,j
(p
(n)
ij − p∞ij ) |B0i〉 〈B0i|AB ⊗ |ηj〉 〈ηj |L
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
∑
i,j
|p(n)ij − p∞ij |︸ ︷︷ ︸
‖en‖1;v
≤ ‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖‖e1‖1;v.
(A.20)
where ‖x‖1;v =
∑k
i=1 |xi| denotes the 1-norm of vectors in Ck.
Eq. (A.20) only concerns the systems of Alice, Bob, and L. To complete the analysis we recall that Eve purifies
ρn and ρfix with the leaked noise transcripts of L. If we take this purifying system, E, into account, i.e. consider
‖ |ψn〉 〈ψn|ABEL−|ψα〉 〈ψα|ABEL ‖1 where ρn = trE [|ψn〉 〈ψn|ABEL], |ψα〉ABEL =
∑
i,j P
∞
ij |B0i〉AB⊗|ηj〉L⊗|ηij〉E
with |P∞ij |2 = p∞ij and ρfix = trE [|ψα〉 〈ψα|ABEL], we find
‖ |ψn〉 〈ψn|ABEL − |ψα〉 〈ψα|ABEL ‖1 ≤
√
n (A.21)
since purifications scale with a square root.
In order to apply the post-selection-based reduction, we need to relate the previously obtained results for i.i.d.
input pairs to general ensembles. As stated in the main text, we exclude the parameter estimation step on
√
n
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initial states for simplicity. We remind the reader, as we have stated in the main text, that for all purifications
|ψ〉ABE′ of a n-partite input state ρAB we have
‖(E ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)− (F ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)‖1 ≤ 4gn,d
√
max
σAB
∥∥(EL −FL) (σ⊗nAB)∥∥1 (A.22)
where gn,d =
(
n+d2−1
n
)
. Thus, inserting the previous result for 2n i.i.d. input states (necessary to achieve n rounds
of distillation) in (A.22) yields
‖(E ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)− (F ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)‖1 ≤ 4g2n,d1/4n .
One square root in the expression above arises from inequality (A.21) and the other square root appears from
inequality (A.22).
Hence, for confidentiality we necessarily need g2n,d
1/4
n → 0 for n→∞. Thus 1/4n should decay faster than g2n,d
grows in n. Numerical simulations suggest that, for f˜0 = 1 − 10−19, this turns out to be true, i.e. the post-
selection-based reduction is applicable (see Figure A2). As stated in the main text such rates are unlikely to be
achievable on the physical level, but they are, at least in principle, possible through fault-tolerant constructions.
n
lo
g
‖f
′ (
p
∞
)n
‖,
−4
lo
g
g 2
n
,d
Figure A2. The figure illustrates log ‖f ′(p∞)n‖ (blue) and −4 log g2n,d (yellow) for the binary pairs and
f˜0 = 1− 10−19.
Fixed point and convergence - General pairs
In the following we show that the previous established results also hold true for the general i.i.d. setting where L
applies all four Pauli operators and each individual pair is arbitrary. We remind the reader that the recurrence
relations for states
∑
i,j,k,l Pijkl |Bij〉AB ⊗ |ηkl〉L ⊗ |ηijkl〉E (i.e. Eve purifies ρn =
∑
i,j,k,l |Pijkl|2 |Bij〉 〈Bij |AB ⊗
|ηkl〉 〈ηkl|L with the leaked noise transcripts) read (by denoting |Pijkl|2 = pijkl) as
p˜δ0δ1γ0γ1 =
∑
i1,i2,j1
i1⊕i2=δ0,i1⊕j1=δ1
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2,k1,l1,k2,l2
u(k1,l1,k2,l2)=(γ0,γ1)
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2p(i1⊕α1)(j1⊕β1)(k1⊕α1)(l1⊕β1)p(i2⊕α2)(i1⊕j1⊕i2⊕β2)(k2⊕α2)(l2⊕β2)
modulo the normalization factor
∑
δ0δ1γ0γ1
p˜δ0δ1γ0γ1 .
For simplicity we assume independent single qubit white noise, i.e. f˜α1,β1,α2,β2 = f˜α1,β1 f˜α2,β2 as well as f˜α1,β1 = f
if α1 = β1 = 0 and (1−f)/3 otherwise. Furthermore, we assume that the initial fidelity F with |B00〉 is sufficiently
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high for distillation. Numerically iterating the recurrence relations (which we again denote by p
f→ p˜) reveal that,
for a sufficiently large number of iterations, the ‘cross-probabilities’ vanish, i.e. p∞ijkl = 0⇔ i 6= k or j 6= l. Hence,
to obtain a fixed point p∞ = (p∞ijkl)
1
i,j,k,l=0 of f , it is reasonable to assume that p
∞
ijkl = 0⇔ i 6= k or j 6= l.
Thus the fixed point p∞ is determined by four equations in four unknowns, namely the equations
pδ0δ1δ0δ1 =
1
N
∑
i1,i2,j1
i1⊕i2=δ0,i1⊕j1=δ1
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
u(i1,j1,i2,i1⊕j1⊕i2)=(δ0,δ1)
f˜α1,β1 f˜α2,β2p(i1⊕α1)(j1⊕β1)(i1⊕α1)(j1⊕β1)
· p(i2⊕α2)(i1⊕j1⊕i2⊕β2)(i2⊕α2)(i1⊕j1⊕i2⊕β2).
where δ0, δ1 ∈ {0, 1} and N =
∑
δ0,δ1
pδ0δ1δ0δ1 . Figure A3 illustrates the numerical estimate of p
∞
0000 as a function
of f .
p
∞ 00
0
0
f
Figure A3. The figure illustrates p∞0000 as a function of f . The fidelity with |B00〉 of the asymptotic state is
equal to unity for a perfect apparatus.
Similar to the case of binary pairs, we can write the recurrence relations f in terms of its Taylor series expansion
around the fixed point p∞, i.e. p˜ = f(p) ≈ f(p∞) + f ′(p∞)(p − p∞). Hence by defining e = p − p∞ we have
e˜ = f ′(p∞)e, i.e. as for binary pairs, the error induced by the 1−norm of the state of Alice, Bob, and L after n
successful distillation rounds satisfies
‖ρn − ρfix‖1 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i,j,k,l
(
p
(n)
ijkl − p∞ijkl
)
|Bij〉 〈Bij |AB ⊗ |ηkl〉 〈ηkl|L
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
∑
i,j,k,l
∣∣∣p(n)ijkl − p∞ijkl∣∣∣ ≤ ‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖‖e1‖1;v.
(A.23)
Figure A4 suggests a linear relationship between the number of successful distillation rounds n and log ‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖
for each noise level f , i.e. b(f)n + a(f) = log ‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖. As the number N of pairs necessary to achieve n
distillation rounds is N = 2n (⇔ n = log2N) we have b(f) log2N + a(f) = log ‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖, which is equivalent
to
‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖ = ea(f)eb(f) log2N = a′(f)N b′(f).
Hence, ‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖ scales as F (N) ∈ O(N b′(f)) where b′(f) < 0 and b′(f) decays for f → 1.
What is left to show, is that the fixed point p∞ is an attracting fixed point. For that purpose we numerically
compute the largest eigenvalue of f ′(p∞), see Fig. A5, and observe that, for noise below 10−1, i.e. 1− f < 10−1,
the largest eigenvalue λmax of f
′(p∞) fulfills λmax < 1, proving that p∞ is an attracting fixed point.
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Figure A4. The figure illustrates the value of log ‖f ′(p∞)n‖ as a function of successful distillation rounds for
single qubit white noise 10−2 (blue), 10−3 (yellow) and 10−4 (green).
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Figure A5. The figure shows the largest eigenvalue of f ′(p∞) (y-axis) for single qubit white noise (x-axis)
This implies that, if the initial fidelity F with |B00〉 is sufficiently large for distillation, the DEJMPS protocol
necessarily converges towards the fixed point p∞ where the ‘cross-probabilities’ vanish.
The analysis so far still lacks Eve’s system E for the leaked noise transcripts. Suppose |ψn〉ABEL and
∣∣ψf〉
ABEL
are purifications of ρn and ρfix, i.e. ρn = trE [|ψn〉 〈ψn|] and ρfix = trE
[∣∣ψf〉 〈ψf ∣∣] respectively. This implies
n = ‖ |ψn〉 〈ψn|−
∣∣ψf〉 〈ψf ∣∣ ‖1 ≤√F (N), i.e. n ∈ O(N b′(f)/2) which we also confirmed with our numeric results.
It is straightforward to extend the analysis above to two-qubit correlated noise introduced by L on the system of
Alice and Bob. For that purpose we assume that f˜α1,β1,α2,β2 = f˜ + (1 − f˜)/16 if α1 = β1 = α2 = β2 = 0 and
(1 − f˜)/16 otherwise. Also in that case we numerically observe that p∞ijkl = 0 ⇔ i 6= k or j 6= l. Hence it is
reasonable to assume that p∞ijkl = 0⇔ i 6= k or j 6= l in order to obtain a fixed point p∞ = (p∞ijkl)1i,j,k,l=0 of f .
Entanglement generation secure against general attacks 22
The fixed point p∞ is determined by four equations in four unknowns, namely the equations
pδ0δ1δ0δ1 =
1
N
∑
i1,i2,j1
i1⊕i2=δ0,i1⊕j1=δ1
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
u(i1,j1,i2,i1⊕j1⊕i2)=(δ0,δ1)
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2p(i1⊕α1)(j1⊕β1)(i1⊕α1)(j1⊕β1)
· p(i2⊕α2)(i1⊕j1⊕i2⊕β2)(i2⊕α2)(i1⊕j1⊕i2⊕β2).
where δ0, δ1 ∈ {0, 1} and N =
∑
δ0,δ1
pδ0δ1δ0δ1 . Figure A6 illustrates the numerical estimate of p
∞
0000 as a function
of f˜ .
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Figure A6. The figure illustrates p∞0000 as a function of f˜ for two qubit correlated noise. The fidelity with |B00〉
of the asymptotic state is equal to unity for a perfect apparatus.
Furthermore we numerically compute the largest eigenvalue of f ′(p∞) and observe that if f˜ > 0.8284, the largest
eigenvalue λmax of f
′(p∞) fulfills λmax < 1, hence p∞ is an attracting fixed point, see Fig. A7.
Finally, we obtain again a linear relationship between the number of successful distillation rounds n and
log ‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖ for each noise level f˜ , i.e. b2(f˜)n+a2(f˜) = log ‖f ′(p∞)n−1‖, see Fig. A8. This implies, similar to
the case of single qubit white noise, that the right-hand-side of (A.23) converges polynomial fast towards zero in
terms of initial states. The rate of convergence is governed by f˜ , i.e. ‖ρn−ρfix‖1 ≤ F2(N) where F2(N) ∈ O(N b2(f˜))
and b2(f˜) < 0 with b2(f˜) decays for f˜ → 1.
Taking the system of leaking noise transcripts into account,this implies that n =
∥∥∥|ψn〉 〈ψn| − ∣∣∣ψf˜〉〈ψf˜ ∣∣∣∥∥∥
1
≤√
F2(N), i.e. n ∈ O(N b2(f˜)/2).
To conclude the analysis, we now show that the noise model of two-qubit depolarizing noise is actually sufficient
to cover any noise process for two-qubit operations. This is the case because for any CNOT-type gate (which
we need to apply in the case of both recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols we consider), one can
depolarize these gates to a standard form [26]. This is done by randomly applying single-qubit operations before
and after the application of the gate, which allows one to reduce any noise characteristics to a specific form with 8
parameters without altering the fidelity of the gate. A further simplification is possible if the noise characteristic
of the apparatus is known [26], which could in some cases be achieved through quantum process tomography. In
this case, one can add additional (local) noise by randomly choosing to apply the gate, or some other (separable)
operation. This allows one to bring any CNOT-type gate (i.e. any two-qubit gate that is equivalent to a CNOT
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Figure A7. The figure shows the largest eigenvalue of f ′(p∞) (y-axis) for correlated two qubit noise (x-axis)
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Figure A8. The figure illustrates the value of log ‖f ′(p∞)n‖ as a function of successful distillation rounds for
two qubit correlated noise 10−2 (blue), 10−3 (yellow) and 10−4 (green).
gate up to single qubit unitary operations that are applied before and after the gate) to the standard form
E(ρ) = f˜UρU† + 1− f˜
16
1∑
α1,β1,α2,β2=0
σα1,β1σα2,β2ρσα1,β1σα2,β2 (A.24)
As outlined in [26] this depolarization procedure causes a change in the gate fidelity of the utilized quantum gates.
More precisely, if the fidelity of the quantum gate before the depolarization was Fg = 1− x then the gate fidelity
after the depolarization is F ′g > 1− 17x. Thus one reduces the quality of the gate by about an order of magnitude
in the worst case by depolarizing to this standard form.
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We observe that (A.24) can be rewritten as
E(ρ) = f˜UρU† + 1− f˜
16
1∑
α1,β1,α2,β2=0
σα1,β1σα2,β2ρσα1,β1σα2,β2
= U
f˜ρ+ 1− f˜
16
1∑
α1,β1,α2,β2=0
σα1,β1σα2,β2ρσα1,β1σα2,β2
U†
= U
 1∑
α1,β1,α2,β2=0
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2σα1,β1σα2,β2ρσα1,β1σα2,β2
U† (A.25)
where f˜0,0,0,0 = f˜ + (1− f˜)/16 and f˜α1,β1,α2,β2 = (1− f˜)/16 otherwise. Recall, that one noisy distillation step of
the DEJMPS protocol including L is given by (A.2). By introducing OD = UuO
′
2−EPP we rewrite (A.2) as
ρ′ =
∑
α1,β1,α2,β2
f˜α1,β1,α2,β2OD(U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2) (|Ψ〉 〈Ψ| ⊗ |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|) (U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2)†O
†
D. (A.26)
We observe that the noise maps U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2 in (A.26) act on Alice’s part of the systems only. But this is
sufficient due to the symmetry of Bell-states - noise on Bobs side can be moved to the other side. Furthermore
the additional σx-flips introduced on the system(s) of L by the unitaries U
(a1)
α1,β1
⊗ U (a2)α2,β2 are used to keep track
of the noise map applied. Because Alice and Bob apply the depolarization procedure as described in [26] and L
keeps track of the effective error introduced, we can safely assume that the additional σx-flips will be introduced
after Alice and Bob complete the depolarization procedure, hence it is sufficient to consider two qubit correlated
noise introduced at Alice’s part of the systems.
Appendix A.2. The BBPSSW protocol
The protocol proposed in [28] (also referred to as BBPSSW protocol) is very similar to the DEJMPS protocol.
Instead of step 1 of Protocol 1 Alice and Bob apply a correlated depolarization procedure (twirl) to their input
states which brings them to Werner form.
For the subsequent analysis, suppose that each pair of Alice and Bob is of the form ρ(p) = p |B00〉 〈B00|+(1−p) 14 id.
We assume that the apparatus applies independent and identical noise of the form Nρ(p) = fρ(p)+(1−f)/4(ρ(p)+
σxρ(p)σx + σyρ(p)σy + σzρ(p)σz) before each distillation step. In similar fashion to the DEJMPS protocol one
easily obtains the recurrence relation for the noisy BBPSSW protocol:
p˜ =
4p2f2 + 2pf
3p2f2 + 3
= b(p).
The fixed point p∞ of the protocol is obtained by solving the equation b(p∞) = p∞. A straightforward computation
gives the fixed point p∞ = 2/3 + 1/3
√
4− 9/f2 + 6/f (which depends on the noise parameter f). It was shown
in [27] that this fixed point is an attractor assuming sufficiently high initial fidelity with |B00〉 per input pair.
Expressing the recurrence relation b in terms of its Taylor series around p∞ leads to
p˜ = b(p) ≈ b(p∞) + b′(p∞)(p− p∞). (A.27)
Hence, (A.27) provides an approximation of the error in terms of fidelity with |B00〉 after n+1 successful distillation
rounds, i.e. n+1 = (b
′(p∞))n 1, see also the plots within Fig. A9. Moreover, we compute the first derivative of b
by
b′(p) =
2f(1 + 4fp− f2p2)
3(1 + f2p2)2
.
Evaluating b′ at p∞ yields
b′(p∞) =
9− 3f
f(3 + 2(2 +
√
4− 9/f2 + 6/f)f) . (A.28)
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Figure A9. The figure illustrates log n+1 for the BBPSSW protocol for different noise parameters f = 0.97
(blue), f = 0.98 (green) and f = 0.99 (red).
From this we conclude that, if the apparatus is perfect, i.e. f = 1 in (A.28), the error in terms of fidelity with
|B00〉 after n+ 1 successful distillation rounds scales as n+1 = (2/3)n1.
Using log2N = n, where N denotes the number of initial states, we infer for n+1 that
n+1 = 1b
′(p∞)log2N = 1
(
2log2 b
′(p∞)
)log2N
= 1N
log2 b
′(p∞).
This implies that n+1 scales as F (N) ∈ O(N log2 b′(p∞)) and thus ‖ρfix − ρn‖1, where ρfix and ρn denote the fixed
point and the state after n successful distillation rounds respectively, scales also as F (N) ∈ O(N log2 b′(p∞)) as
mentioned in the main text.
For the analysis of two qubit correlated noise we assume that the noisy operations used by the BBPSSW protocol
are of the form
O12ρ = f˜O
ideal
12 ρ+
1− f˜
4
tr12 [ρ]⊗ id12 (A.29)
where ρ is a two qubit density operator and Oideal12 denotes the ideal two qubit quantum gate. Observe that (A.29)
coincides with the standard form of [26]. If the noisy quantum gates are not of the form (A.29) we bring them
to that standard form via the same depolarization procedure mentioned in the analysis of the DEJMPS protocol.
Hence the following anaylsis is not restricted to this specific noise model, but actually applies to arbitrary noise
processes describing noisy two qubit gates.
It has been shown in [27] that the BBPSSW protocol converges for noisy CNOT gates of the form (A.29) to a
unique and attracting fixed point if f˜ is sufficiently high. The recurrence relation for the fidelity relative to |B00〉
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obtained in [27] is given by the formula
F ′ =
f˜2(F 2 + ( 1−F3 )
2) + 1−f˜
2
8
f˜2(F 2 + 2F (1−F )3 + 5(
1−F
3 )
2) + 1−f˜
2
2
. (A.30)
Hence one obtains as in [27] the respective fixed points of (A.30) to be
Fmin,max =
3±
√
10− 9/f˜2
4
.
For F ∈ (Fmin, Fmax) we have that F ′ > F which shows that Fmax is an attracting fixed point. By replacing F ′
in (A.30) with b˜(F ) we observe similar to (A.27) that the error after n+ 1 successful distillation rounds scales for
two qubit correlated noise as F (N) ∈ O(N log2 b˜′(Fmax)) where N denotes the number of initial states.
Finally we provide a worst case analysis of the BBPSSW protocol. For that purpose assume the following scenario:
The noisy apparatus performs with probability fI the ideal distillation step EI and introduces with probability
1 − fI an arbitrary noise map E⊥. More precisely, we decompose the distillation step taken by Alice and Bob
before the measurement of the target system as the CP map
E(ρ) = fIEI(ρ) + (1− fI)E⊥(ρ)
where ρ is a four qubit density operator. Notice that one can always decompose a noisy map in this form, where
both maps are completely positive and trace preserving. We remark, however, that the map EI denotes the ideal
protocol which includes an abort option, i.e. we only keep the first pair if the results of the measurements on the
second pair coincide. The map E⊥ may similarly contain such an abort branch. The noise parameter fI describes
the quality of the overall map ∗, i.e. one can think of the process that with probability fI the desired procedure
(including gates and measurements) is performed, while with probability (1−fI) something else happens (described
by the map E⊥).
We will now consider the worst case for the map E⊥ w.r.t. entanglement distillation. The worst case for
the BBPSSW protocol is that the apparatus introduces a state orthogonal to |B00〉 on the source system and
the state |B00〉 on the target system as this will always contribute to the overall success probability of a
distillation step of the BBPSSW protocol but lead at the same time to a lower fidelity relative to |B00〉 after
the measurement of the target system compared to the ideal distillation step. One example for such a map is
given by E⊥(ρ) = |B01〉 〈B01| ⊗ |B00〉 〈B00|. Any other map will lead to a larger fidelity after the distillation step
followed by depolarization to Werner form. We thus have
F ′ ≥ fI(F
2 + ( 1−F3 )
2)
fI(F 2 +
2F (1−F )
3 + 5(
1−F
3 )
2) + 1− fI
(A.31)
for the fidelity relative to |B00〉. This formula can be understood as follows: The ideal protocol is applied with
probability fI, and succeeds with probability fsuc, thereby producing a fidelity F˜ . The map E⊥ is applied with
probability (1− fI), does never abort and does not contribute to the final fidelity (which is clearly the worst case).
We thus have F ′ ≥ fIfsucF˜ /[fIfsuc + (1− fI)]
We now analyze the worst case scenario, i.e. assuming equality in (A.31). Since we know that at each step the
actual noise map produces an output density operator with a larger fidelity than the worst-case map, we can
conclude that the resulting fidelity of any noise map will be larger than the fixed point which is achieved by the
worst-case map. We remark, however, that this does not constitute a full confidentiality proof for arbitrary noise
maps, as it is not evident from this analysis that for any fixed noise map a unique fixed point is reached. Assuming
equality in (A.31), one can compute that the fixed points of the noisy BBPSSW protocol are in this case given by
the solutions of
−fI + (9− 2fI)F∞ − 14fIF 2∞ + 8fIF 3∞ = 0 (A.32)
which only depend on the noise parameter fI. We define gfix(x, fI) = −fI + (9 − 2fI)x − 14fIx2 + 8fIx3 which
implies that (A.32) reads as gfix(F∞, fI) = 0. The question how many solutions of (A.32) are real we easily answer
by the discriminant of gfix. We obtain for the discriminant of gfix
∆(fI) = −36(648fI − 873f2I − 212f3I + 436f4I ). (A.33)
∗We remark that a similar analysis can be performed by modelling local operations of Alice and Bob sepearetely in this way.
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Hence if ∆(fI) > 0 then all three solutions of (A.32) are real. We numerically estimate that ∆(fIcrit) = 0 for
fIcrit ≈ 0.9641, hence for fI > fIcrit there exist three real solutions of (A.32) because ∆(fI) > 0 for fI > fIcrit ,
see Fig. A10. Thus, for fI > fIcrit , we compute the fixed points of the noisy BBPSSW protocol via solving
fI
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Figure A10. The figure illustrates the discriminant ∆(fI) of (A.32). For fI > 0.9641 we have ∆(fI) > 0.
(A.32). Fig. A11 shows the function gfix for different values of fI. From Fig. A10 and A11 we infer that we have
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Figure A11. The figure illustrates the function gfix for fI = 0.97 (blue), fI = 0.98 (yellow), fI = 0.99 (green)
and fI = 1 (red). The fixed points of the BBPSSW protocol correspond to the zero’s of gfix(F, fI).
three possible fixed points for fI > fIcrit . Hence we need to show that the fixed point with the highest fidelity
relative to |B00〉 obtained via (A.32) is an attracting fixed point. We solve this issue by showing that F ′ > F for
F ∈ (Fmin, Fmax) (where Fmin denotes the second, and Fmax the third fixed point in Fig. A11). From Fig. A12
we find that F ′−F > 0 for fI > fIcrit , hence F ′ > F which shows that Fmax is an attracting fixed point whenever
starting with initial fidelity F > Fmin.
Furthermore, by assuming equality in (A.31) and replacing F ′ with b⊥(F ), we observe similar to (A.27) that the
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Figure A12. The figure illustrates F ′ − F for fI = 0.97 (blue), fI = 0.98 (yellow), fI = 0.99 (green) and fI = 1
(red).
error after n+ 1 successful distillation rounds scales in this worst case analysis as F (N) ∈ O(N log2 b′⊥(Fmax)) where
N denotes the number of initial states.
Appendix B. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols
In this section we provide the proofs of Lemma 3 and Lemma 5 of the main text, crucial for the de-Finetti-based
and post-selection-based reduction techniques. Both proofs require only one specific property of the real protocol
Eα: after passing the parameter estimation phase the entanglement distillation protocol always converges to one
fixed point, i.e. the fixed point is unique, an attractor for all the states which pass the parameter estimation and
depends on the noise parameters only, as this implies that the distance with respect to the 1−norm within the
ok−branch of the protocol is bounded and converges towards zero.
Appendix B.1. Proof of Lemma 3
We first state the following lemma which establishes a connection between measurements on one subsystem of a
bipartite state and tensor product states.
Lemma 8. [Steering of local states] Let ρAB be a bipartite (in general, mixed) state and let ρA = trB [ρAB ] and
ρB = trA [ρAB ]. Furthermore let ρ
φ
B be defined as
ρφB =
trA [(|φ〉 〈φ| ⊗ I)ρAB ]
pA(φ)
where |φ〉 ∈ HA and pA(φ) = tr(|φ〉 〈φ| ρA). If ‖ρφB − ρB‖1 ≤  for all |φ〉 ∈ HA, then
‖ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ 2C (B.1)
where C only depends on the dimensions of A and B. In particular, if we fix the number of qubits of A and B to
2 respectively, then we have C = 48.
Proof. In the following we denote the four Pauli operators by
σ0 = id, σ1 = σx, σ2 = σz, σ3 = σy.
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First we decompose ρAB in the Pauli basis, i.e. we have
ρAB =
1
2n+m
∑
i,j
αijσi ⊗ σj (B.2)
where n and m denote the number of qubits of A and B respectively and we use the notations i = (i1, .., in) and
j = (j1, .., jm) where each ik and jk are in {0, .., 3} as well as σi =
⊗n
k=1 σik and σj =
⊗m
k=1 σjk . Recall that
tr(σ0) = 2 and tr(σ1) = tr(σ2) = tr(σ3) = 0. From this one easily computes ρA and ρB by
ρA = trB [ρAB ] =
1
2n+m
∑
i,j
αijσitr(σj) =
1
2n
∑
i
αi0σi, (B.3)
ρB = trA [ρAB ] =
1
2n+m
∑
i,j
αijtr(σi)σj =
1
2m
∑
j
α0jσj. (B.4)
Using (B.2), (B.3) and (B.4) we obtain for (B.1)
‖ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ 1
2n+m
∑
i,j
‖(αij − αi0α0j)σi ⊗ σj‖1 = 1
2n+m
∑
i,j
|αij − αi0α0j| · ‖σi ⊗ σj‖1
=
2n+m
2n+m
∑
i,j
|αij − αi0α0j| =
∑
i,j
|αij − αi0α0j| = ‖a− a′‖1;C4n+m (B.5)
where a = (α00, .., α3n3m), a
′ = (α00α00, .., α3n0α03m) and ‖ · ‖1;C4n+m denotes the 1−norm of vectors in C4
n+m
.
Hence in order to prove (B.1) it is sufficient to prove ‖a−a′‖1;C4n+m ≤ 2C. By assumption we have for ρφB where
|φ〉 ∈ HA and pA(φ) = tr((|φ〉 〈φ| ⊗ I)ρAB) that ‖ρφB−ρB‖1 ≤  for all |φ〉 ∈ HA. Moreover, according to Theorem
9.1 in [32] we have for all |ξ〉 ∈ HB
1
2
|pB(ξ|φ)− qB(ξ)| = 1
2
∣∣∣tr(|ξ〉 〈ξ| ρφB)− tr(|ξ〉 〈ξ| ρB)∣∣∣ ≤ max
Em
1
2
∑
m
∣∣∣tr(EmρφB)− tr(EmρB)∣∣∣ = ‖ρφB − ρB‖1 ≤ 
(B.6)
where pB(ξ|φ) denotes the conditional probability of obtaining the outcome φ on system A and the outcome ξ on
system B and {Em} denotes a POVM on the subsystem of B. Suppose we perform a projective measurement on
the systems of A and B denoted by {|ψk〉AB} = {|φk〉A ⊗ |ξk〉B} where k ∈ {1, .., 4n+m} on ρAB and ρA ⊗ ρB .
This yields for the respective probabilities pAB(ψk) and qAB(ψk) of observing outcome k for ρAB and ρA ⊗ ρB
pAB(ψk) = tr(|ψk〉 〈ψk| ρAB) = tr(|φk〉 〈φk|A ⊗ |ξk〉 〈ξk|B ρAB) = tr(|ξk〉 〈ξk|B trA [(|φk〉 〈φk|A ⊗ I)ρAB ])
= tr
(
|ξk〉 〈ξk|B pA(φk)ρφkB
)
= pA(φk)tr
(
|ξk〉 〈ξk|B ρφkB
)
= pA(φk)pB(ξk|φk),
qAB(ψk) = tr(|ψk〉 〈ψk| ρA ⊗ ρB) = tr(|φk〉 〈φk| ρA)tr(|ξk〉 〈ξk| ρB) = qA(φk)qB(ξk)
where pB(ξk|φk) denotes the conditional probability of obtaining outcome φk on system A first and obtaining
outcome ξk on system B. We observe pA(φk) = qA(φk). Thus we obtain
|pAB(ψk)− qAB(ψk)| = pA(φk)|pB(ξk|φk)− qB(ξk)| ≤ 2pA(φk)
using (B.6). In order to compute a bound for (B.5) we use quantum state tomography, see e.g. [33]. For that
purpose we perform an informationally complete POVM induced by different separable bases on HA ⊗HB . More
precisely, we choose that many POVMs such that we have in total 4n+m different outcomes. We observe for
|ψk〉AB = |φk〉A ⊗ |ξk〉B that
pAB(ψk) =
1
2n+m
∑
i,j
〈φk|σi |φk〉 〈ξk|σj |ξk〉αij and qAB(ψk) = 1
2n+m
∑
i,j
〈φk|σi |φk〉 〈ξk|σj |ξk〉αi0α0j. (B.7)
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Enumerating (B.7) for 1 ≤ k ≤ 4n+m yields 4n+m equations for a, i.e.
pAB(ψ1) =
1
2n+m
∑
i,j
〈φ1|σi |φ1〉 〈ξ1|σj |ξ1〉αij, (B.8)
...
pAB(ψ4n+m) =
1
2n+m
∑
i,j
〈φ4n+m |σi |φ4n+m〉 〈ξ4n+m |σj |ξ4n+m〉αij (B.9)
as well as 4n+m equations for a′
qAB(ψ1) =
1
2n+m
∑
i,j
〈φ1|σi |φ1〉 〈ξ1|σj |ξ1〉αi0α0j, (B.10)
...
qAB(ψ4n+m) =
1
2n+m
∑
i,j
〈φ4n+m |σi |φ4n+m〉 〈ξ4n+m |σj |ξ4n+m〉αi0α0j. (B.11)
We can rewrite the systems of equations (B.8)-(B.9) and (B.10)-(B.11) using
T =
 〈φ1|σ0 |φ1〉 〈ξ1|σ0 |ξ1〉 ... 〈φ1|σ3n |φ1〉 〈ξ1|σ3m |ξ1〉... ... ...
〈φ4n+m |σ0 |φ4n+m〉 〈ξ4n+m |σ0 |ξ4n+m〉 ... 〈φ4n+m |σ3n |φ4n+m〉 〈ξ4n+m |σ3m |ξ4n+m〉

and p = (pAB(ψ1), .., pAB(ψ4n+m)) and q = (qAB(ψ1), .., qAB(ψ4n+m)) as
p =
1
2n+m
Ta and q =
1
2n+m
Ta′
respectively. Hence 2n+m(p − q) = T (a− a′). Moreover we observe that T is invertible if the POVM is
informationally complete, see [33] for details. Thus, inverting T and taking norms on both sides yields
‖a− a′‖1;C4n+m ≤ 2n+m‖T−1‖‖p− q‖1;C4n+m = 2n+m‖T−1‖
∑
k
|pAB(ψk)− qAB(ψk)|
≤ 2n+m‖T−1‖
∑
k
2pA(φk) ≤ 2‖T−1‖4n+m2n+m
which completes the proof for the general case with C = ‖T−1‖4n+m2n+m.
Before we complete the Lemma we need to determine C for the case of n = m = 2. We choose∣∣φ43(j1−1)+42(j2−1)+4(j3−1)+j4〉 = ∣∣φ′j1〉⊗ ∣∣φ′j2〉⊗ ∣∣φ′j4〉⊗ ∣∣φ′j4〉 where j1, j2, j3, j4 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and
|φ′1〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2, (B.12)
|φ′2〉 = (|0〉+ i |1〉)/
√
2, (B.13)
|φ′3〉 = |0〉 , (B.14)
|φ′4〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2, (B.15)
which is informationally complete and thus a valid choice. This choice of |φ′l〉 corresponds to a Pauli tomography
on a single qubit. We observe that the matrix T is invertible and compute ‖T−1‖ = 16. Thus C = 48 which
completes the proof.
Roughly speaking Lemma 8 states that if all post-selected reduced states of a bipartite state, where each partition
consists of two qubits, are η−close then the overall state is 2 · 48η close to a product state.
We gave the lemma in a more general form as it may have utility beyond the scope of this paper. However for our
purposes we need a stronger, but more specific result. In the following lemma we will show that we can achieve
the same result even if the measurements must succeed above a threshold, which is important in the application
of the lemma.
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Lemma 9. In the situation of Lemma 8 for n = m = 2 it suffice to consider measurements on the subsystem A
which have a probability greater than or equal to 1/16.
More precisely, for every state ρAB there exists a unitary U acting on system A and a state ρ
′
AB = (U⊗IB)ρAB(U⊗
IB)
†, such that if the state ρ′AB meets the conditions of Lemma 8, i.e. subsystem B is −non-steerable via
measurements on subsystem A for all measurements with probability greater than or equal to 1/16, then
‖ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ 2C. (B.16)
Proof. First we construct the state ρ′AB associated with ρAB and show that it suffice to consider measurements of
probability greater than or equal to 1/16. Recall the situation of Lemma 8. Let ρAB be a bipartite (in general,
mixed) state and let ρA = trB [ρAB ] and ρB = trA [ρAB ]. Furthermore let ρ
φ
B be defined as
ρφB =
trA [(|φ〉 〈φ| ⊗ I)ρAB ]
pA(φ)
where |φ〉 ∈ HA and pA(φ) = tr(|φ〉 〈φ| ρA). Then the claim of Lemma 8 was: If ‖ρφB − ρB‖1 ≤  for all |φ〉 ∈ HA,
then
‖ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ 2C (B.17)
where C only depends on the dimensions of A and B. In particular, if we fix the number of qubits of A and B to
2 respectively, then we have C = 48.
Further recall that the set
∣∣φ43(j1−1)+42(j2−1)+4(j3−1)+j4〉 = ∣∣φ′j1〉 ⊗ ∣∣φ′j2〉 ⊗ ∣∣φ′j4〉 ⊗ ∣∣φ′j4〉 where j1, j2, j3, j4 ∈{1, 2, 3, 4} of Lemma 8, i.e. (B.12)–(B.15), is informationally complete and thus suffice to reconstruct any 4 qubit
quantum state where
|φ′1〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2, (B.18)
|φ′2〉 = (|0〉+ i |1〉)/
√
2, (B.19)
|φ′3〉 = |0〉 , (B.20)
|φ′4〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2. (B.21)
In order to prove the claim, we use the following observation: The state ρA = trB [ρAB ] is a two qubit quantum
state, so it can be written as
ρA =
3∑
j=0
λj |Ψj〉 〈Ψj | (B.22)
where the states |Ψj〉 correspond to the (orthogonal) eigenstates of ρA for the real non-negative eigenvalues λj .
Hence there exists at least one j′ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} such that λj′ ≥ 1/4, which corresponds to the maximum of the
eigenvalues λj . Now we choose a local unitary U such that U |Ψj′〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |0〉. Applying this unitary to (B.22)
therefore leads to the state
ρ′A = U
 3∑
j=0
λj |Ψj〉 〈Ψj |
U† = λj′ |00〉 〈00|+ 3∑
j 6=j′
λj |ϕj〉 〈ϕj | (B.23)
where |ϕj〉 = U |ψj〉. We compute the probability for any projector applied on ρ′A which is taken from the set
(B.18)–(B.21) and of the form |φ′〉 〈φ′| = |φ′k〉 〈φ′k| ⊗ |φ′l〉 〈φ′l| by
tr (|φ′〉 〈φ′| ρ′A) = tr
(|φ′k〉 〈φ′k| ⊗ |φ′l〉 〈φ′l|UρAU†) = 3∑
j=0
λjtr
(|φ′k〉 〈φ′k| ⊗ |φ′l〉 〈φ′l|U |Ψj〉 〈Ψj |U†)
≥ 1
4
tr
(|φ′k〉 〈φ′k| ⊗ |φ′l〉 〈φ′l|U |Ψj′〉 〈Ψj′ |U†) = 14tr (|φ′k〉 〈φ′k| ⊗ |φ′l〉 〈φ′l| |00〉 〈00|)
=
1
4
tr (|φ′k〉 〈φ′k| |0〉 〈0|) tr (|φ′l〉 〈φ′l| |0〉 〈0|) ≥
1
4
1
2
1
2
=
1
16
(B.24)
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where we have used that tr(AB) = tr(BA) for matrices A and B and that tr (|φ′k〉 〈φ′k| |0〉 〈0|) ≥ 1/2 for all
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
So we define the state ρ′AB as ρ
′
AB = (U⊗IB)ρAB(U⊗IB)†. Observe that the probabilities of all projectors within
the tomographic set (B.18)–(B.21) are greater than or equal to 1/16 for the state ρ′A.
Now suppose we perform a measurement from the tomographic set (B.18)–(B.21) on the subsystem A of ρ′AB
yielding outcome |φ〉. The post-selected state conditioned on |φ〉 reads as
ρ′φB =
trA [(|φ〉 〈φ| ⊗ I)ρ′AB ]
pA(φ)
where pA(φ) ≥ 1/16. Furthermore assume as in Lemma 8 that ‖ρ′φB − ρB‖1 ≤  for all such |φ〉 ∈ HA. Then
Lemma 8 implies that
‖ρ′AB − ρ′A ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ 2C. (B.25)
The proof completes by observing that ρ′AB and ρ
′
A ⊗ ρB are related by the local unitary U to ρAB and ρA ⊗ ρB
and the unitary equivalence of the trace distance, i.e.
‖ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB‖1 = ‖(U ⊗ IB)(ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB)(U ⊗ IB)†‖1 (B.26)
= ‖ρ′AB − ρ′A ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ 2C. (B.27)
We observe that, due to the proof of Lemma 9, which relies on the informationally complete set (B.18)–(B.21),
it suffices to be non-steerable with respect to the measurements within that set for a probability of measurement
above or equal to 1/16. We actually have proven a stronger result, as the actual choice of measurements does not
matter, provided the probability of success is above or equal to the threshold 1/16.
Lemma (Lemma 3 in main text - Product Form Lemma). Let ρ be an arbitrary mixed state shared by Alice and
Bob and let |ψ〉ABE be a purification thereof held by Eve. Furthermore, let P1 correspond to a (distillation-type)
real protocol and P2 correspond to the associated (distillation-type) ideal protocol, i.e.
P1(ρ) = pρσAB ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| ,
P2(ρ) = pρσαAB ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| .
where α characterizes the level of the noise, σαAB, and σ
⊥
AB are two fixed two qubit states. Furthermore, let P1 and
P2 satisfy the following properties:
(1) The noise transcripts do not leak to Eve.
(2) The protocol P1 guarantees to converge towards some state σαAB within the ok-branch of the protocol and
maxµAB ‖(P1 − P2)(µAB)‖1 ≤ ε.
Then it holds that
‖(P1 ⊗ idE − P2 ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1 ≤ (34 · 48 + 1)ε. (B.28)
Proof. The proof relies on Lemma 8 and 9. Suppose Eve prepares the pure state |ψ〉ABE and let trE [|ψ〉 〈ψ|] = ρAB
be the state received by Alice and Bob. Then we have
(P1 ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = pρσABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ σE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| , (B.29)
(P2 ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = pρσαAB ⊗ σE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ σE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| .
If we post-select Eq. (B.29) on the ok−branch we have after normalization
1
pρ
(idABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|)(P1 ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = σABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok| . (B.30)
It is obvious from the fact that the protocol is performed by Alice and Bob per definition that any measurement
of Eve in the ok−branch can be commuted to the beginning of the protocol P1 because Eve is not part of the
protocol. Hence her measurement only changes the input of the protocol P1 and thus either cause an abort or not.
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We call the final state of Alice and Bob η−Eve-non steerable if for all φ ∈ HE we have ‖σφAB − σAB‖1 ≤ η where
σφAB = trE
[
1
pE(φ)
(idAB ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|E)σABE
]
. We sketch the remainder of this proof as follows: We show, that the
final state of Alice and Bob is Eve-non steerable in the sense of Lemma 8 by making use of the bounded distance
of the protocols P1 and P2. Furthermore, Lemma 9 implies that it suffice to consider measurements of Eve of
having probability greater than or equal to 1/16. Therefore Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 completes the proof.
Because the output of Alice and Bob are 2 qubits the purifying system that Eve holds is without loss of generality
also a two-qubit system. Hence, according to Lemma 9, there exists a state σ′ABE , which is unitarly related to
σABE via an unitary U on Eve’s system only (which is not part of the protocol) and for which it suffice to consider
measurements of Eve having probability greater than or equal to 1/16. Furthermore observe that this local unitary
of Eve can not change the success probability of the overall protocol as unitaries are CPTP. In other words, the
success probabilities associated with σABE and σ
′
ABE are identical.
More formally, suppose Eve performs a projective measurement on this state σ′ABE (which stems from a purification
|ψ′〉ABE of ρ′AB which is unitarly related to the purification |ψ〉ABE of ρAB and both having the same success
probability, see paragraph above) and observes outcome |φ〉 ∈ HE having probability greater than or equal to
1/16. Then the post-selected state of Alice, Bob, and Eve conditioned on that particular outcome φ reads as
1
pE(φ)
(idAB ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|E)(σ′ABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|) =
1
pE(φ)
(idAB ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|E)
1
pρ
(idABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|)(P1 ⊗ idE)(|ψ′〉 〈ψ′|ABE)
=
1
pρφ
(idABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|)(P1 ⊗ idE)
(
idAB ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|E
p′E(φ)
|ψ′〉 〈ψ′|ABE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρφABE
=
1
pρφ
(idABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|)(P1 ⊗ idE)(ρφABE)
= σφABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok| .
More importantly, we relate the probability of the protocol succeeding for initial state ρ′, pρ, and the probability
of measuring φ after the protocol, pE(φ), to the probability of the protocol succeeding for the initial state ρ
φ
ABE
(measurement of Eve commuted to the beginning of the protocol), pρφ , and the probability of measuring φ before
the protocol has started, p′E(φ), via
pρpE(φ) = pρφp
′
E(φ). (B.31)
Observe that (B.31) is equivalent to
pρpE(φ)
p′E(φ)
= pρφ (B.32)
We note that the state σφABE is in the ok−branch of the protocol P1. The next step is to apply Lemma 8 which
relates the distances ‖σ′ABE−σAB⊗σ′E‖1 and ‖σ′AB−σφAB‖1. In particular we show that for all measurements of Eve
with outcome |φ〉 ∈ HE having a probability greater than or equal to 1/16 we have that ‖σ′AB − σφAB‖1 ≤ 17ε/pρ.
This then implies using Lemma 9 that ‖σABE − σAB ⊗ σE‖1 ≤ 34Cε/pρ. In detail, using the triangle inequality
we compute for the distance between σ′AB and σ
φ
AB
‖σ′AB − σφAB‖1 ≤ ‖σ′AB − σαAB‖1 + ‖σαAB − σφAB‖1 =
1
pρ
‖(P1 − P2)(ρ′AB)‖1 +
1
pρφ
‖(P1 − P2)(ρφAB)‖1
≤
(
1
pρ
+
1
pρφ
)
max
µAB
‖(P1 − P2)(µAB)‖1. (B.33)
Now we employ (B.32) in (B.33) which yields
‖σ′AB − σφAB‖1 ≤
(
1
pρ
+
p′E(φ)
pρpE(φ)
)
max
µAB
‖(P1 − P2)(µAB)‖1 ≤
(
1
pρ
+
1
pρpE(φ)
)
max
µAB
‖(P1 − P2)(µAB)‖1
=
1
pρ
(
1 +
1
pE(φ)
)
max
µAB
‖(P1 − P2)(µAB)‖1 ≤ 1
pρ
(1 + 16) max
µAB
‖(P1 − P2)(µAB)‖1
≤ 17
pρ
ε (B.34)
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because pE(φ) ≥ 1/16 and maxµAB ‖(P1 − P2)(µAB)‖1 is bounded by ε by assumption. Hence we apply Lemma
8 to σ′ABE with  =
17
pρ
ε which implies for the distance between σ′ABE and σAB ⊗ σ′E that
‖σ′ABE − σAB ⊗ σ′E‖1 ≤
34 · 48
pρ
ε (B.35)
where the factor 48 is the constant C of Lemma 8 depending on the dimensions of the systems of Alice/Bob and
Eve, for which we have n = m = 2. Furthermore, this implies via Lemma 9 that
‖σABE − σAB ⊗ σE‖1 ≤ 34 · 4
8
pρ
ε (B.36)
because σABE and σAB ⊗ σE are unitarly related to σ′ABE and σAB ⊗ σ′E via the unitary U on Eve’s system.
Finally, employing (B.36) in (B.28) yields
‖(P1 ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)− (P2 ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 = pρ‖σABE − σαAB ⊗ σE‖1
≤ pρ(‖σABE − σAB ⊗ σE‖1 + ‖σAB ⊗ σE − σαAB ⊗ σE‖1)
≤ 34 · 48ε+ ε = (34 · 48 + 1)ε.
Appendix B.2. Proof of Lemma 5
Now we turn to the proof of Lemma 5 of the main text. For that purpose we remind the reader that the final
state after the distillation protocol including the system of L is pure. Thus, the following Lemma will turn out to
be very useful.
Lemma 10. Let ρAB and ϕAB = |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ µB be two mixed states. Furthermore, assume that ρA = trB [ρAB ]
satisfies ‖ρA − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ‖1 ≤ ε and ρB = trA [ρAB ] = µB. Then ‖ρAB − ϕAB‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε.
Proof. By assumption we have ‖ρA − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ‖1 ≤ ε. Moreover, let |ψ〉ABR be a purification of ρAB . According
to Lemma A.2.7 in [9] there exists a purification |ϕ〉A ⊗ |ξ〉BR of ϕAB such that ‖ |ψ〉ABR − |ϕ〉A ⊗ |ξ〉BR ‖vec ≤√‖ρA − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ‖1 = √ε where ‖ |ψ〉 ‖vec = √〈ψ|ψ〉 and ABR〈ψ|ϕ〉A|ξ〉BR is real and non-negative. Moreover,
Lemma A.2.3 of [9] gives
‖ |ψ〉 〈ψ|ABR − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ |ξ〉 〈ξ|BR ‖1 ≤ 2‖ |ψ〉ABR − |ϕ〉A ⊗ |ξ〉BR ‖vec ≤ 2
√
.
We define ξB = trR [|ξ〉 〈ξ|BR]. As the 1-norm does not increase under the partial trace we have
‖ρB − ξB‖1 ≤ ‖ρAB − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ ξB‖1 ≤ ‖ |ψ〉 〈ψ|ABR − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ |ξ〉 〈ξ|BR ‖1 ≤ 2
√

by construction. Moreover, the assumption ρB = µB implies ‖µB − ξB‖1 = ‖ρB − ξB‖1 ≤ 2
√
ε. This gives us
‖ |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ µB − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ ξB‖1 = ‖µB − ξB‖1 ≤ 2
√
ε. If we combine these results we obtain
‖ρAB − ϕAB‖1 = ‖ρAB − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ µB‖1 ≤ ‖ρAB − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ ξB‖1 + ‖ |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ ξB − |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|A ⊗ µB‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε
which proves the claim.
Lemma 10 enables us to prove Lemma 5 of the main text.
Lemma (Lemma 5 of the main text). Let E be the real protocol which guarantees to converge towards a unique
and attracting fixed point depending on the noise parameter only. Let F be the ideal protocol as defined in the
main text. Furthermore let ρ be a mixed state (consisting of n systems) shared by Alice and Bob. If the extension
of E and F to the system of L satisfies ‖EL(ρ)−FL(ρ)‖1 ≤ ε(n), then
‖(E ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)− (F ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε(n)
for all purifications |ψ〉ABE′ of ρ.
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Proof. As mentioned in the main text, we introduce a two-level flag system held by Alice which indicates whether
they aborted the protocol or not. So we observe
EL(ρ) = pρσABEL ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok| + (1− pρ)σ⊥ABEL ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| ,
FL(ρ) = pρ
∣∣ψf〉 〈ψf ∣∣
ABEL
⊗ |ok〉 〈ok| + (1− pρ)σ⊥ABEL ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| ,
where E denotes the system of leaked noise transcripts to Eve. By assumption we have ‖EL(ρ)−FL(ρ)‖1 ≤ ε(n).
This is equivalent to pρ‖σABEL − |ψf 〉 〈ψf |ABEL ‖1 ≤ ε(n) since EL(ρ) and FL(ρ) are equal on the fail branch.
This we can rewrite to ‖σABEL − |ψf 〉 〈ψf |ABEL ‖1 ≤ ε(n)/pρ.
Moreover, applying the real and ideal protocol to the purification |ψ〉ABE′ results in
(E ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′) = pρσABEE′ ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok| + (1− pρ)σ⊥ABEE′ ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| ,
(F ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′) = pρσfABE ⊗ ρE′ ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok| + (1− pρ)σ⊥ABEE′ ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| .
Again, both expression are equal in the fail branch, thus the 1-norm simplifies to
‖(E ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)− (F ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)‖1 = pρ‖σABEE′ − σfABE ⊗ ρE′‖1. (B.37)
Hence it is sufficient to show pρ‖σABEE′ − σfABE ⊗ ρE′‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε(n). We observe that by introducing the system
L held by L that
pρ‖σABEE′ − σfABE ⊗ ρE′‖1 ≤ pρ‖σABELE′ − |ψα〉 〈ψα|ABEL ⊗ ρE′‖1. (B.38)
One easily verifies trE′ [σABELE′ ] = σABEL and trABEL [σABELE′ ] = ρE′ because the system E
′ is not changed by
the protocol E . Moreover, by assumption we have ‖σABEL − |ψf 〉 〈ψf |ABEL ‖1 ≤ ε(n)/pρ. Thus we apply Lemma
10 to ρA′B′ := σABELE′ and ϕA′B′ = |ψf 〉 〈ψf |ABEL ⊗ ρE′ where A′ := ABEL and B′ := E′ which implies
‖σABELE′ − |ψf 〉 〈ψf |ABEL ⊗ ρE′‖1 ≤ 4
√
ε(n)/pρ. (B.39)
Employing (B.38) and (B.39) in (B.37) yields
‖(E ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)− (F ⊗ idE′)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE′)‖1 ≤ pρ4
√
ε(n)/pρ = 4
√
pρε(n) ≤ 4
√
ε(n)
which completes the proof.
Appendix C. Confidentiality of entanglement distillation protocols whenever the noise transcripts
leak
In this section we show how the confidentiality guarantees regarding an entanglement distillation protocol can be
extended to the case whenever the noise transcripts leak to Eve.
We remind the reader that it is not necessary to leak the noise transcripts to Eve after every single distillation
round. It is sufficient to copy all noise transcripts at the very end to Eve’s register, as L is not accessible and Eve
is not part of the protocol being executed by Alice and Bob.
Theorem (Theorem 7 in main text). Let E be the real protocol and F be the ideal protocol. Furthermore, let E l
be the real and F l be the ideal protocol when the noise transcripts leak to Eve. Then
‖(E ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)− (F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1 ≤ ε(n)
implies that
‖(E l ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)− (F l ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1 ≤ 2
√
ε(n). (C.1)
for all purifications |ψ〉ABE of initial state ρAB consisting of n systems
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Proof. We observe that
(E ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = pρσABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ σE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| ,
(F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = pρσαAB ⊗ σE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ σE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| .
So by assumption we have
‖(E ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)− (F ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)‖1 = pρ‖σABE − σαAB ⊗ σE‖1 ≤ ε(n),
i.e. ‖σABE − σαAB ⊗ σE‖1 ≤ ε(n)/pρ.
As outlined in the main text we model L in terms of purifications. Because purifications are unitarly equivalent
we choose a particular purification of σαAB ⊗ σE . Thus we fix |ψF 〉ABL1L2E = |ψ′〉ABL1 ⊗ |ψ′′〉L2E where|ψ′〉ABL1 =
∑
i,j ωij(α) |Bij〉AB |ij〉L1 . The purifying systems L1 and L2 we attribute to the Lab Demon.
Moreover, according to Lemma A.2.7 in [9] there exists a purification |ψE〉 of σABE such that ‖ |ψF 〉ABL1L2E −
|ψE〉ABL1L2E ‖vec ≤
√
ε(n)/pρ where ‖ |ψ〉 ‖vec =
√〈ψ|ψ〉 and ABL1L2E〈ψF |ψE〉ABL1L2E is real and non-negative.
Furthermore, Lemma A.2.3 of [9] gives
‖ |ψE〉 〈ψE |ABL1L2E − |ψF 〉 〈ψF |ABL1L2E ‖1 ≤ 2‖ |ψE〉ABL1L2E − |ψF 〉ABL1L2E ‖vec ≤ 2
√
ε(n)/pρ. (C.2)
When the noise transcripts leak to Eve, L effectively copies the noise transcripts |ij〉L1 to Eve, resulting in the
pure state |φ〉ABL1L2EE′ =
(∑
i,j |Bij〉AB |ij〉L1 |ij〉E′
)
⊗ |ψ〉L2E . Hence we can model the leakage of the noise
transcripts to Eve by a unitary UM such that UM |ψF 〉ABL1L2E |0〉E′ = |φ〉ABL1L2EE′ .
For the protocol when the noise transcripts leak to Eve we have
(E l ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = pρσ′ABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ σE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail|
= pρtrL1L2
[
UM |ψE〉 〈ψE |U†M
]
⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ σE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail|
(F l ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = pρσ′αABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ σE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail|
= pρtrL1L2
[
UM |ψF 〉 〈ψF |U†M
]
⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|+ (1− pρ)σ⊥AB ⊗ σE ⊗ |fail〉 〈fail| .
Because the real and the ideal protocol are equal in the fail-branch we obtain by using (C.2)
‖(E l ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)− (F l ⊗ idE)(|ψ〉 〈ψ|ABE)‖1
= pρ ‖σ′ABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok| − σ′αABE ⊗ |ok〉 〈ok|‖1
= pρ
∥∥∥trL1L2 [UM |ψE〉 〈ψE |U†M]− trL1L2 [UM |ψF 〉 〈ψF |U†M]∥∥∥
1
≤ pρ
∥∥∥UM |ψE〉 〈ψE |U†M − UM |ψF 〉 〈ψF |U†M∥∥∥
1
= pρ ‖|ψE〉 〈ψE | − |ψF 〉 〈ψF |‖1 ≤ 2
√
ε(n)pρ ≤ 2
√
ε(n)
which proves (C.1).
Thus the confidentiality of a protocol where the noise transcripts leak to Eve is bounded by the confidentiality of
the same protocol when they do not.
Appendix D. Quantum one-time padding after the real protocol
In this section we show that a final secret twirl applied to the pair of Alice and Bob decouples Eve completely
from the remaining state. Keep in mind that for this Alice and Bob require two classical bits unknown to Eve.
Recall that the state of Alice, Bob, Eve, and L after n distillation rounds is pure and of the form |ψ〉 =∑
i,j,k,l Pijkl |Bij〉AB |ηkl〉L |ηijkl〉E . Tracing over L yields the mixed state
ρABE =
∑
i1,i2,j1,j2
∑
k,l
Pi1j1klP
∗
i2j2kl |Bi1j1〉 〈Bi2j2 | ⊗ |ηi1j1kl〉 〈ηi2j2kl| . (D.1)
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Suppose Alice and Bob apply a secret twirl T to (D.1), i.e. they apply stochastically the family of operators
{id,K1,K2,K1K2} where K1 = σx ⊗ σx and K2 = σz ⊗ σz. These are two stabilizers of the Bell state, i.e.,
Kr11 |Bi1j1〉 = (−1)i1r1 |Bi1j1〉 ,
Kr22 |Bi1j1〉 = (−1)j1r2 |Bi1j1〉 .
Hence, applying the secret twirl T to (D.1) gives
T ρABE =
∑
r1,r2
i1,i2,j1,j2,k,l
1
4
Pi1j1klP
∗
i2j2klK
r1
1 K
r2
2 |Bi1j1〉 〈Bi2j2 |Kr11 Kr22 ⊗ |ηi1j1kl〉 〈ηi2j2kl|
=
∑
r1,r2
i1,i2,j1,j2,k,l
(−1)i1r1(−1)j1r2(−1)i2r1(−1)j2r2 1
4
Pi1j1klP
∗
i2j2kl |Bi1j1〉 〈Bi2j2 | ⊗ |ηi1j1kl〉 〈ηi2j2kl|
=
∑
i1,i2,j1,j2
|Bi1j1〉 〈Bi2j2 | ⊗
1
4
∑
k,l
Pi1j1klP
∗
i2j2kl |ηi1j1kl〉 〈ηi2j2kl|
∑
r1,r2
(−1)(i1+i2)r1(−1)(j1+j2)r2
=
∑
i1,j1
|Bi1j1〉 〈Bi1j1 | ⊗
∑
k,l
|Pi1j1kl|2 |ηi1j1kl〉 〈ηi1j1kl| .
Note that in the resulting state
∑
i1,j1
|Bi1j1〉 〈Bi1j1 | ⊗
∑
k,l
|Pi1j1kl|2 |ηi1j1kl〉 〈ηi1j1kl| Eve decouples, i.e. Alice/Bob and
Eve have a separable state. The obtained resource state can be used to establish a confidential quantum channel
by means of quantum teleportation.
Appendix E. Robustness of recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol
To complete the security characterization of entanglement distillation protocols we also consider the robustness
of an entanglement distillation protocol. To define this term precisely we first need the definition of a honest
eavesdropper.
Definition 11. We call an eavesdropper honest, if the states sent by the eavesdropper are of the form |B00〉⊗2n .
It is obvious that a honest eavesdropper is not entangled with the ensemble delivered to Alice and Bob via the
noisy quantum channel. Moreover we formally define the robustness of a protocol by:
Definition 12 (Robustness of a protocol). We call a protocol Eα εR-robust, if for a honest eavesdropper the
probability of aborting the protocol is at most εR.
Now we show that we can tune the robustness of a recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol to be
exponentially small in terms of necessary number of input pairs.
Theorem 13. Let M ∈ N such that Alice and Bob achieve ε-confidentiality by succeeding M rounds of a recurrence-
type entanglement distillation protocol. Furthermore assume that Alice and Bob receive n pairs from a honest
eavesdropper over the quantum channel Φ⊗n (where Φ(ρ) = βρ + (1 − β)/4
(∑
i,j σi,jρσi,j
)
) such that, after the
parameter estimation step of the proposed protocol, k −√k pairs (where k −√k = c2M and c = ξ2M+2) are left
for entanglement distillation. Then, the robustness εR of the protocol is bounded by
εR ≤ exp
(
−(3β − 4Fmin(α)− 1)2
√
k/128
)
+M exp (−ξ) .
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is to request sufficiently many pairs from Eve such that the probabilities of
abort during the protocol to be exponentially small while still having enough pairs left to achieve M rounds of a
recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol. We divide the proof into two parts:
• Part 1: We prove that the probability of aborting the recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocol due
to parameter estimation is exponentially small.
• Part 2: We prove the same holds true for aborting the protocol during entanglement distillation.
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Part 1: Suppose Eve sends the state |B00〉⊗n through the noisy quantum channel Φ⊗n to Alice and Bob. Applying
Φ to |B00〉 〈B00| yields
ρAB = Φ (|B00〉 〈B00|) = (3β + 1)/4 |B00〉 〈B00| + (1− β)/4 (|B10〉 〈B10| + |B01〉 〈B01| + |B11〉 〈B11|) . (E.1)
Thus the state Alice and Bob receive is ρ⊗nAB . According to the preceding protocols proposed in the main text,
Alice and Bob apply a symmetrization to ρ⊗nAB , and, depending on the noise level of the apparatus, they might
have to trace out n−k pairs or not. For the subsequent analysis we assume that this tracing out step is necessary,
i.e. the de-Finetti-based reduction needs to be applied. Hence, Alice and Bob continue by applying a twirl to each
remaining pair. Since ρ⊗kAB is invariant under permutations and ρAB is Bell-diagonal, the remaining state after
twirling is equal to ρ⊗kAB .
Next, they apply to
√
k of the remaining k pairs the parameter estimation for estimating the fidelity of each pair.
Necessary for convergence of all recurrence-type entanglement distillation protocols is that the fidelity F of ρAB
with |B00〉 satisfies F > Fmin(α). Hence this step is crucial in order to guarantee successful distillation.
For that purpose, we measure b√kc of k pairs by applying two-qubit measurements. To be more precise, we apply
a σx ⊗ σx to the first and σz ⊗ σz measurement to the second pair. We refer to this measurements by M1 and M2
respectively. We observe that the state |B00〉 is a common eigenstate of M1 and M2 with eigenvalue 1. We define
to each pair of pairs a random variable Xi for i ∈ {1, .., b
√
kc/2} with Xi = 1 whenever both measurements M1
and M2 yield outcome 1 and Xi = 0 else.
Furthermore we assume for the expected value E(X) of the fidelity with |B00〉 that E(X) = Fmin(α) + δ, where
δ > 0 will be fixed below. The protocol will be aborted if the estimate is below Fmin(α) + δ.
From (E.1) we observe that, whenever (3β + 1)/4 ≤ Fmin(α), the entanglement distillation protocol will not
distill any entanglement. This implies for the quantum channel Φ that, if β ≤ (4Fmin(α) − 1)/3 the parameter
estimation step will abort, independent of the input provided by Eve. Thus we assume for the subsequent analysis
that β > (4Fmin(α)− 1)/3.
Moreover we define η = δ/2. Hence we get by the Hoeffdings inequality [34] for the probability of an error larger
than η in our measured estimate X for the fidelity the following expression:
P(|E(X)−X| ≥ η) ≤ exp
(
−η2
√
k/2
)
=: ppe-abort.
Thus the probability of aborting the protocol due to an error in the parameter estimation is exponentially small
in number of necessary input pairs. In order to fix δ we recognize that Alice and Bob abort the protocol whenever
(3β + 1)/4 < Fmin(α) + δ. This is equivalent to δ > (3β − 4Fmin(α) − 1)/4. Inserting the definition of η yields
η > (3β − 4Fmin(α)− 1)/8 and thus ppe-abort < exp
(
−(3β − 4Fmin(α)− 1)2
√
k/128
)
.
Part 2: What remains to be shown is that the probability of aborting the protocol in the distillation phase is
also exponentially small in the number of input pairs. For that purpose, we assume that the noise level α of the
apparatus is such that distillation is feasible. In the following we show that we can force the probability of abort
due to entanglement distillation to be exponentially small in terms of requested input pairs.
We assume that Alice and Bob are left with c2M pairs after parameter estimation. Recall that the Chernoff
inequality for a sequence of independent Bernoulli random variables X1, ..., Xn where P (Xi = 1) = p and d ∈ [0, 1]
reads as
P
(∑
i
Xi ≤ (1− d)pn
)
≤ exp
(
−d
2
2
pn
)
.
Moreover, we observe that a basic distillation step can be modelled by a Bernoulli random variable Xi where
P (Xi = 1) = p is the probability of succeeding (measurement outcomes coincide).
Suppose we perform m rounds of entanglement distillation. Let Nm denote the number of input pairs to the m-th
round and let d ∈ [0, 1]. Then the Chernoff inequality implies that the probability that less than (1− d)pNm basic
distillation steps at round m have succeeded is bounded by exp
(
−d22 pNm
)
, i.e.
pabort,m = P
(∑
i
Xi ≤ (1− d)pNm
)
≤ exp
(
−d
2
2
pNm
)
. (E.2)
Entanglement generation secure against general attacks 39
Figure E1. M rounds of entanglement distillation
But this also implies that, with probability 1 − pabort,m, at least (1 − d)pNm + 1 basic distillation steps
have succeeded at round m. Thus we may safely assume that Nm+1 = (1 − d)pNm + 1. The situation
is summarized in Fig. E1. Furthermore we have N1 = c2
M . Eliminating the recurrence relation yields
Nm+1 = (1− d)mpmc2M +
∑m−1
i=0 (1− d)ipi. This implies for (E.2)
pabort,m ≤ exp
−d
2
2
p
(1− d)m−1pm−1c2M +
m−2∑
i=0
(1− d)ipi︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

 ≤ exp
(
−d
2
2
(1− d)m−1pmc2M
)
.
Furthermore, we compute the probability of aborting the protocol at distillation round m (assuming that the
previous rounds 1, ..,m− 1 succeeded) by
pabort at round m = pabort,m
m−1∏
k=1
psucceed,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤ pabort,m ≤ exp
(
−d
2
2
(1− d)m−1pmc2M
)
. (E.3)
The events of aborting the distillation protocol at two different rounds i and j are disjoint. Thus we have for the
probability of aborting in any of m rounds pabort in any of m rounds =
∑m
k=1 pabort at round k. A simple consequence
thereof is
pabort in any of M rounds =
M∑
k=1
pabort at round k ≤
M∑
k=1
exp
(
−d
2
2
(1− d)k−1pkc2M
)
(E.4)
where we have used (E.3). Inserting p = 1/2 and d = 1/2 in (E.4) yields
pabort in any of M rounds ≤
M∑
k=1
exp
(
−1
8
1
22k−1
c2M
)
=
M∑
k=1
exp
(−c2M−2k−2) ≤M exp (−c2M−2M−2)
= M exp
(
−c2−(M+2)
)
. (E.5)
By assumption we have c = 2M+2ξ which implies for (E.5)
pabort in any of M rounds ≤M exp
(
−ξ2M+22−(M+2)
)
= M exp (−ξ) .
Thus, the probability of aborting the protocol satisfies
εR ≤ ppe-abort + (1− ppe-abort)pabort in any of M rounds ≤ exp
(
−(3β − 4Fmin(α)− 1)2
√
k/128
)
+M exp (−ξ)
which completes the proof.
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Appendix F. Establishing a confidential quantum channel
For illustration purposes, we show how confidential quantum channels can be realized using our proposal in
conjunction with standard teleportation. By our results, the joint state of Alice, Bob, and Eve after the distillation
protocol is  close to the output of the ideal protocol. The latter, since the register of L is not accessible to any of
the parties and thus is traced out, yields the state of the form (provided the protocol was not aborted)
ρfinal =
∑
i,j
|ωij(α)|2 |Bij〉 〈Bij |AB ⊗ |ηij〉 〈ηij |E . (F.1)
The teleportation of any state ρ from Alice to Bob will yield the state∑
i,j
|ωi,j(α)|2σjxσizρσizσjx ⊗ |ηij〉 〈ηij |E . (F.2)
Thus the only information Eve can obtain is what noise operator was applied on the teleported state, and nothing
more – thus, the channel is confidential. Moreover, the probabilities for the different noise processes are not under
Eve’s control, but depend on the local devices.
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